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ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION OF
POWER PLANT SITING: EXISTING AND
PROPOSED INSTITUTIONS
A. DAN TARLocK,* ROGER TIPPY,** FRANCES ENSEKI FRANCIS * **

INTRODUCTION
Electric energy requirements for the nation are expected to increase
by 250 per cent over present levels by 1990.1 Accordingly, we must plan
now for the regulation of the design and location of the nuclear and
fossil fuel power plants and transmission lines necessary to meet this
developing need. However, because the power plants may cause both
thermal and air pollution, as well as landscape blight, their regulation
must be viewed, not as an isolated problem of meeting demands for
electricity, but in conjunction with the nation's emerging environmental management policies. 2 This article will analyze the legal methods
for compelling regulatory agencies to consider and assess the environmental impact of this future power source development. In many
instances protection of environmental values will increase the cost
of the production and distribution of electricity, and hard policy choices
will have to be made between the benefits of environmental enhance* A.B. Stanford, 1962; LL.B. Stanford, 1965; Associate Professor of Law, Indiana
University, Bloomington.
** A.B. Stanford, 1962; LL.B. Yale, 1965; Assistant Attorney General (Environmental
Protection Division), Commonwealth of Massachusetts.
*** A.B. Dickinson College, 1962; LL.B. Yale, 1965; M.P.A. Harvard, 1969; Attorney,
Federal Power Commission, 1965-1970.
The opinions expressed in this article are personal to the authors and do not reflect
the policy of institutions with which they have been or are now associated.
Professor Tarlock would like to express appreciation to the Law Center of the
University of Southern California, where he was a Visiting Associate Professor in the
Spring of 1971, working on the University's Sea Grant Program, funded by the National
Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration, U.S. Dept. of Commerce, and to Professor
Michael E. Levine, principal investigator for the project.
1. Federal Power Commission, Accompanying Statement of Federal Power Commission Chairman John N. Nassikas printed in Trends and Growth Projections of the
Electric Power Industry, Environmental Effects of Producing Electric Power, Hearings
Before the Joint Comm. on Atomic Energy, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 53, 54 (1970) [hereinafter
cited as 1969 Atomic Energy Hearing].

2. See generally A Review of Energy Issues and the 91st Congress, Prepared by the
Environmental Policy Division Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress at the
request of Henry M. Jackson, Chairman, Committee for Insular Affairs, United States
Senate, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
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ment and economic efficiency.3 It will be assumed that the demand for
power will continue to increase and that the most fruitful method of
minimizing the adverse effects is to concentrate on questions of site
location and national fuels policy.4
The assessment of technology is one of the most complex problems
facing both industry and those public officials charged with the protection of the environment. Historically we have assessed potential technological developments without serious concern for their secondary
consequences, and as a result we have often suffered major social costs
as by-products." Therefore, if scientific and technological developments
3. Aggregate cost data for pollution abatement and environmental enhancement are
difficult to project because each plant's optimal programs may consist of different sets of
alternatives and therefore clear policies specifying the level of control required do not
exist. A 1969 report prepared for the National Coal Conference, Inc. projected maximum
costs for thermal pollution abatement between 1970-80 ranging from 2,464 million dollars
for a "practical maximum" policy to 6,855 million for a "pristine" purity policy which
required all existing and future plants to recycle their own cooling water. Cheney & Smith,
A Systems Analysis of Aquatic Thermal Pollution and its Implications, Vol. I, Summary

Report, reprinted in

WATER PoLLuTIoN-1969 HEARINGS BEFORE THE SENATE SUBCOMM=rrrx

ON AIR AND WATER POLLUTION OF COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC WORKS ON S. 7 AND S. 544, at 45,
71 (1969) [hereinafter cited as WATER PoLLtrnoN-1969].
At the present time it is impossible to compute precise cost-benefit ratios for these
choices. For example, to devise a tax system based on the full social marginal cost of a
discharge of residuals, "the government would have to estimate literally billions of tax
rates. This is because almost every production process or act of consumption contributes
a different mix of wastes to the total waste flow of the economy." d'Arge & Hunt, Environmental Pollution, Externalities, and Conventional Economic Wisdom: A Critique, 1
ENVIRON. AYFAIas, 266, 279 (1971). See also Krier, The Pollution Problem and Legal
Institutions:A Conceptual Overview, 18 U.C.L.A.L. Rxv. 429, 437 (1971).
4. See Starr, Energy and Power, SCIENTIFIC AmmucAN, September, 1971, at 37-40. This
article will be concerned with the structure of existing and proposed regulatory procedures
and with state and federal regulatory policy. It will not directly consider the role of
citizen suits in influencing power plant site selection, although such suits play a very
useful role in the current site selection process as they insure a more consistent presentation of alternative viewpoints than do hearings before licensing agencies charged with
environmental protection. They also assemble and present information unknown to or
ignored by public agencies. However, citizen groups have less incentive to undertake the
long range planning necessary to develop a rational site selection policy and thus we have
chosen to focus on the institutional basis for this kind of decision-making. For a discussion
of the newly developing concept of a public right of action see Hanks & Hanks, An Environmental Bill of Rights: The Citizen Suit and the National Environmental Policy Act
of 1969, 24 trras L. R1v. 230 (1970). Note, The Role of the Judiciary in the Confrontation with the Problems of Environmental Quality and Comment, Thermal Electric Power
and Water Pollution: A Siting Approach, 46 IND. L.J. 61 (1970). The case for a litigation
approach to these problems is made in J. SAX, DEFENDING THE ENVIRONMENT (1970) and
Sive, The Role of Litigation In Environmental Policy: The Power Plant Siting Problem,
11 NAT. Rzs. J. 467 (1971).
5. The problem is that although the benefits of technology are brought before the
public, the "negative factors and risks are never fully or even adequately articulated."
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are to continue at their current exponential rate it is clearly imperative
that the present assessment methods be improved. This problem is
compounded by the fact that the most complex ecosystems are also the

most stable. Thus, any large-scale use of technology which replaces a
complex ecosystem with a simple one may, in the long run, create very

unstable systems. Further, the effects of modifying one link in a food
chain may not be known for long periods of time and often cannot be
forecast at the time of application. Thus, accurate assessment is extremely difficult under the best of circumstances and is often impossible

under existing regulatory procedures and standards which were created
to deal with only the non-environmental problems of fuel and energy.
Traditionally our waterways and airsheds have been treated as free

goods, and because the marginal value of a free good to any one additional user is close to zero, there has been little or no incentive for the

establishment of a property system which would function to force users
to internalize the social costs of such uses as residual disposal. But this
situation is changing:
What is appearing now, however, is a vast asymmetry in the
adequacy of our property institutions (which, of course, underlie
all private exchange) to handle resource allocation problems. On
the one hand, in the production of basic natural resources commodities, property institutions with some controls and adjustments, in general, serve quite well to lead production into highest
productivity channels now and in the future. On the other hand,
the flow of residuals back to the environment is heavily weighted
to media where private property institutions can function imperfectly, if at all. Once these media become overloaded on a signifiGreen, The Adversary Process in Technology Assessment, Hearings Before the Subcomm.
on Science and Astronautics, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 353 (1969). The reasons are well-known
but bear repeating:
In some cases the risks are totally unappreciated until a later date; in other
cases, there may be an appreciation of possible risks which have not yet been
demonstrated to be real. The proponents of the technology may always be
counted upon to minimize or suppress the risks. Although the proponents are
usually well organized and well-financed in their articulation of the benefits,
those who seek to advance the negative factors tend to be rather disorganized and
to lack resources. Not infrequently-particularly in the case of governmentsponsored technologies-it is difficult for the opponents to obtain relevant and
adequate information about risks, and even more difficult, because the experts
who are privy to the relevant information are usually pro-technology, to obtain
experts to assist them in formulation of their contentions. The natural consequence is that the opposition is forced to state its case using information which is
incomplete or not wholly accurate, and, therefore, is easily discredited. Frequently the establishment seeks to discredit the opposition ad htominem, and
this exacerbates the situation forcing the opposition to take an extreme position
which makes it even easier for the proponents to discredit their contentions on
their merits.
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cant scale, they are free goods no more but, rather, natural
resources of ever increasing value as economic development pro-

ceeds.6

In 1965, 20 per cent of all primary energy was consumed by electric utilities. Plants which burn high sulfur coal or oil are a substantial
burden on air resources because they discharge huge amounts of pollutants. Further, these plants, especially the nuclear ones, are becoming
even larger, increasing their potential adverse impact on the landscape.
When they are located in or near the more affluent suburbs or scenic
undeveloped areas they are often vigorously opposed by nearby residents as well as conservation groups. 7 The problem is that currently
there is no single agency at any level of government which can accomodate the clash between the economic and the environmental interests.
The existing regulation is sadly fragmented between the various levels
of government. Nevertheless, regulatory agencies are still better
equipped to handle this dispute than are private law suits because
eventually the agencies can balance legitimate competing interests
according to a consistent set of policies often established on a national
level." The solution then, is to create new regulatory agencies or to
revise the existing ones effectively to confront the problem.
6. A. KXNEm, R. AYERS, & R. 'ArGE, ECONOMICS AND THE ENVIRONMENT: A MATERIAS
BALANCE APPROACH 13-14 (1970).
7. However, they are often actively courted by small, semi-economically depressed
areas or small towns near metropolitan centers. But even in remote areas such as southern
Nevada, utilities are encountering stringent regulation. An example is the Mohave Generating Station located in the Nevada Desert which was designed to discharge around one
ton of fly ash per hour, representing a soot removal efficiency of 97%. However, this does
not conform with county ambient air standards promulgated under the 1967 Clean Air
Act which permit only one-half ton per hour requiring a 98.6% efficiency rate. See Hill,
Struggle in the Desert: Power Versus Environment, N.Y. Times, July 7, 1970, at 22, col. 1.
8. In this case the agencies follow a national fuels policy. Cf. Jaffe, Book Review,
84 HARv. L. REv. 1562, 1565 (1971). However, we do not agree with many of the proponents
of one-stop licensing of power plants that the purpose of the agency should be to shield
utilities from public scrutiny. AEC Commissioner James E. Ramey, an early advocate of
a federal licensing procedure for all power plants, balks at the implications of Scenic
Hudson Preservation Conf. v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608 (1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966),
which is the most explicit judicial formulation of a theory of environmental protection
through licensing. "It seems clear that an overreaction by licensing agencies to the
Scenic Hudson doctrine in an effort to make their decisions appeal-proof could introduce
considerable unnecessary delay into the licensing of affected agencies." Ramey & Murray,
Delays and Bottlenecks in the Licensing Process Affecting Utilities: The Role of Improved
Procedures and Advanced Planning, 1970 DuKE L.J. 25, 28. Our concern is not with
delay per se but with a series of prolonged licensing challenges which do not contribute
to the development of a long-range accommodation between power and environmental
policies.
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We examine three basic topics in this article: (1) the existing
process of public utility site selection; (2) the major potential environmental side-effects which flow from the choice of site and which are
not generally taken into account by utilities in their cost calculations;
and (3) existing and proposed methods of site selection regulation. Our
objective is to determine how the utility's basic decision-making process
must be changed to make it more responsive to environmental impacts,
and which method of public regulation can best accomplish these
changes. Thus, we will not be concerned with problems such as radiological hazards which exist regardless of the site chosen. Our basic
premise is that the existing process of utility decision-making and, to
a lesser extent, public regulation has been concerned with the short-run
or first order consequences of the impact of a plant on the environment
where ideally an attempt should be made to anticipate its long-run or
second order consequences.
I.

UTILITY DECISION-MAKING

The utility's decision can be classified into three basic choices:
1. Choice of Energy Form
The choice of fuel for a proposed generating station is among conventional nuclear, coal, oil and natural gas. Energy demand projections,
and resource supply estimates dictate increased reliance on nuclear
fuels in the future, 9 but the basic consideration is cost. For example,
in the mid 1960's utilities began to order nuclear plants as a result of
large expenditures (by the AEC and a few major firms such as General
Electric) which promised to make nuclear reactors competitive with
coal burning plants.10
2. Choice of Site
The decision about the location of a power plant is dictated by proximity to load centers, land requirements, fuel supply and transportation
access. 1 Another major factor is the proximity of a direct water source.
9. By the year 2000 it has been predicted that the estimated fossil fuel reserves
will be dangerously low. Starr, supra note 4, at 42.
10. See Arthur D. Little, Inc., Report to U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, U.S.
Department of Justice, Competition In the Nuclear Power Supply Industry, Contract No.
AT (30-1)-3853, at 112 (1968).
11. For a comprehensive survey of historic utility site planning criteria see The
Energy Policy Staff, Office of Science and Technology, Considerations Affecting Steam
Plant Site Selection 7-16 (1968). A good discussion of the problems utilities face in adapting existing patterns of decision-making to take into account environmental side-effects is

POWER PLANT SITING

This is crucial because water is the cheapest and easiest way to cool
the condensors. However, little attention has been paid to possible
environmental ramifications. The utilities generally viewed any such
problems as a matter of effective public relations to be solved by "educating the public" about the benefits of nuclear power.'1 Thus, it should
be obvious that the choice of site has immensely important ecologisurcal consequences and may foreclose other uses of the water and
3
initiative.'
private
to
left
be
not
should
and
area
rounding land
3. Choice of Design
At this level the utility decides questions such as whether transmission
lines should run underground or overhead, whether cooling waters
should be discharged directly into receiving waters or through cooling
towers.' 4 As we have indicated the most important environmental
decision may be site selection but substantial means of avoiding adverse
environmental impacts are possible in the design of the plant. For
example, the depth placement of a cooling water intake and the intake
velocity of the cooling water can mean the difference between protecting or endangering microscopic organisms around the plant.' 5
II.

ENVIRONMENTAL SIDE EFFECTS OF SITE SELECTION AND METHODS OF MINIMIZATION
A.

TI-m ViAL DISCHARGE

The principal source of thermal discharge is the water used to cool and
condense the steam which drives the turbines. If "once through" coolCALIFORNIA INsTrruTE OF TECHNOLOGY, ENVIRONMENTAL

QUALITY

LABORATORY,

PEOPLE,

POWER AND POLLUTION: ENVIRONMENTAL AND PUBLIC INTEREST ASPECTS OF ELECTRIC PowER

PLANT SITING 19-21 (1971) [hereinafter cited as PEOPLE, POWER AND POLLUTION].
12. See EDISON ELECRIC INSrrruT COMMIrFEE ON ENVIRONMENT, MAJOR ELECTRIC

(1970).
I. For example, the Baltimore Gas and Electric Company chose to construct a
plant at a point on Chesapeake Bay where certain fish pass during migration. Under
then existing Maryland law the utility was able to start construction before requesting
a water use permit which would have been the first opportunity for a public review of
the site selection.
14. See Intergovernmental Coordination of Power Development and Environmental
Protection Act, Hearings on S. 2752 Before the Senate Subcomm. on Intergovernmental
Relations of the Comm. of Government Operations, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., 95-395 (1970)
[hereinafter cited as Hearings on Intergovernmental] for a comprehensive collection of
material exploring the decisions involved in the planning and regulation of the plant at
Acmrrms AND THE ENVIRONMENT, PLANT SITING TASK FORCE 12

Calvert Cliffs, Maryland.
15. See Natural Resources Institute, University of Maryland, Comments On Propo-

sal by Baltimore Gas and Electric Company for Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Plant, reprinted in
Hearings on Intergovernmental,supra note 14, at 355-57.
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ing is used, this cooling water is discharged directly into the receiving
water. 16 Fossil fuel plants operate at a maximum of 42 per cent efficiency and nuclear plants at about 33-34 per cent efficiency although
experts predict that this differential will be eliminated in the next 20
years. The present significance of the differential is that to maintain the
same energy output as a coal plant, a nuclear plant may have to dis7
charge up to 50 per cent more water.
Thermal discharges can cause two basic types of environmental
damage. Fish may be eliminated from a body of water either by raising
the temperature to the species' lethal limit or by raising it to the lethal
limit of a key element in the fishes' food chain. Existing pollution can
be aggravated because the addition of heat to the water reduces the
natural waste assimilative capacity of the water-the dissolved oxygen
levels of water may decrease with a rise in temperature while the biochemical oxygen demand increases, thus causing bacterial action to
accelerate unless the water is already nutrient deficient. This is especially critical during the summer months when water temperatures are
highest and the natural oxygen supply is decreased because of low flows
and high natural temperatures. All species have some tolerance to
environmental change and thus may adjust over time to a gradual rise
in temperature, but the range of tolerance is limited. The metabolism
rate of fish, and as a result the fish's demand for oxygen, doubles with
each 100 rise. At temperatures below the ultimate incipient lethal level
the fish continue to absorb the necessary oxygen but can no longer do
16. It has been alleged that 50% of the nation's water will be effected by the year
2000 if "once through" cooling continues. Hearings on H.R. 4148 and Related Bills Before
the House Comm. on Public Works, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 387 (1969) (Statement of Hon.
Howard W. Robinson, N.Y.) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on H.R. 4148].
17. The magnitude of reject heat is a function of (1) thermal capacity (2) net heat
rate and (3) efficiency. Efficiency is the measure of a plant's capacity to convert British
thermal units into electricity. Reject heat is calculated by first multiplying the net heat
rate times efficiency. This figure gives the amount of energy consumed in producing a
kilowatt hour and when the energy consumed is subtracted from the net heat rate, the
difference is the wasted heat. The total hourly reject heat rate is obtained by multiplying
the reject heat rate by the number of kilowatts of electricity the plant produces in an
hour. In addition, the stack losses for coal plants must be calculated. Engineers calculated
that one reactor has the capacity of two average coal plants and thus "it is reasonable
to double coal plant figures to arrive at a fair comparison. When this is done, the coal
station will reject 4 to 6 million BTU's to water as opposed to 8 billion for a reactor.
This is the basis for the often quoted 50%0 differential which applies only to water and
does not take into account heat lost up the stack which can constitute a significant heat
island having possible micrometeorological consequences." Amato, Heat Discharges from
Nuclear Reactors, PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONFERENCE ON INTERNATIONAL AND INTERSTATE Re.ULATION OF WATER POLLUTION 189, 191 (1970) (Columbia University School of Law).
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so when the lethal level is reached. However, the mere fact that this
level is not reached is not relevant unless one also knows the rate of
acclimation time to adjust to the rise in temperature. If the temperature
rises too rapidly, thermal shock may result. This shock may cause fish
such as the salmon to lay its eggs prematurely or not spawn at all so
that a potential crop of fish will be lost.18
There are several possible alternatives to direct heat discharge
although each has either financial or environmental costs. 19 The premier method is the use of cooling towers or ponds. Another method is
to discharge the heated water into the cooler lower strata of the receiving waters, especially lakes and reservoirs, so that dense currents will
promote mixing. Alternatively, dams and barriers can be constructed to
separate the heated water from the normal water course. Estuaries and
coastal areas will be increasingly favored in the future because of increased efficiency of the cold sea waters to absorb waste heat. 20 As part
of a regional interchange program, power plants could be operated on
18. In 1968 the Senate Subcommittee on Air and Water Pollution of the Committee
on Public Works held a series of hearings on thermal pollution and a number of technical
papers are reprinted in the hearings. See, Mihursky & Kennedy, Water Temperature Criteria to Protect Aquatic Life (Natural Resources Institute, University of Maryland) reprinted in Thermal Pollution- 1968, Hearings Before the Senate Subcomm. on Air and
Water Pollution, Comm. on Public Works, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 117 (1968) [hereinafter
referred to as 1968 Thermal Pollution Hearings].
19. See Staff of the Bureau of Power Federal Power Commission, Problems in Disposal of Waste Heat from Steam-Electric Plants (1969) for a more detailed discussion
of the alternatives. The hot water may either be sprayed into the air or recycled. Two
major problems with cooling towers have been noted:
1. "The closer the temperature of the cooled tower approaches the wet bulb tem-

perature the larger the tower must be with consequent increases in tower costs." Id. at
7.

2. "Because of the large surface area required for heat transfer and the large volumes of air that must be circulated, dry cooling towers are substantially more expensive
than evaporative cooling towers. Where used, it would not be possible to obtain as high
efficiency as steam-electric plants served by evaporative cooling processes. The effect of
discharging large amounts of heated air into the atmosphere is not known." Id. at 14.
For a comparison of the costs of the various types of cooling towers see Woodson, Cooling
Towers, ScIENTIFIC AMERICAN, May 1971, 70, 77.
20. The National Estuarine Pollution Study projects that 30% of all power plants
will be located in coastal zones and recommends that consideration be given to the use
of off-shore islands or the construction of artificial ones. Report of the Secretary of Interior
to the United States Congress Pursuant to P.L. 89-753, The National Estuarine Pollution
Study 335-36 (1970).
Florida has proposed thermal pollution guidelines which would force the location
of the state's new plants along the Atlantic coast because that is the only location with
"waters deep enough, with enough tidal action to handle large volumes of hot water
N.Y. Times, Nov. 28,
discharge and still maintain temperatures with the guidelines ..
1971, at 20, col. 3.
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a seasonal basis so that the discharge did not occur during the time its
impact on the environment is harmful. Indeed, there may be beneficial
uses for heated water (thermal enrichment) such as the irrigation and
the cultivation of oysters, crabs and mussels, especially in northern
latitudes where species are not yet living at the upper limits of their
tolerance levels. 21 The use of heated water for space heating and irrigation is also possible but there are many problems with its use for these
purposes on a large scale.
B.

AIR POLLUTION

Coal burning steam electric generating plants contribute about 50 per
cent of the total amount of sulfur dioxide-one of the most damaging
pollutants to human health-discharged into the atmosphere each
year.22 The Senate Committee on Public Works estimates that: "Even
assuming maximum technological development and application of
sulfur control devices and reasonable fuel substitution practices for
fossil-fuel steam plants and the expected arrival of the breeder reactor,
the best that will occur by the year 2000 is that SO2 (sulfur dioxide)
produced by power plants will be about a factor of three greater than
that of 1970."23 Because the prospects for efficient stack removal processes are limited, the best long range solution lies in the substitution
of low for high sulfur fuels. Natural gas is the most desirable available
low sulfur substitute but its scarcity makes the competition for it
intense. 24 More gas may become available through increased exploration and importation 25 but the best long-run method of increasing
reserves is the gasification of coal. 26 This has the advantage of transforming a reasonably plentiful, "dirty" resource into an environmentally desirable one. Research is also underway to desulfurize coal at the
mine, but full-scale gasification plants are not scheduled to become
operational until the end of the 1970's. Until recently, the coal and
21.

See Mihursky, On Possible Constructive Uses of Thermal Additions to Estuaries,

17 BIoscmENcE 698 reprinted in 1968 Thermal Pollution Hearings, supra note 18, at 131.
Testifying in favor of a proposed nuclear plant in Wicasset, Maine, the Chairman of the
Department of Biology at Woods Hole Oceanographic Institute predicted that the discharge of heated water would produce beneficial effects-for example, raising temperatures to permit oysters to spawn- because "The great majority of organisms living in
the estuary ... are living at ... the northern limit of their distribution." Id. at 267.
Sr. ANN. RPT., COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QuALrrY 68 (1970).
22.

23. Staff of the Senate Comm. on Public Works, Report on Some Environmental
Implications of National Fuels Policies, 91st Cong., Ist Sess., 10 (1970).
24. Reserve to production ratios have been falling since 1960. See id. at 13.

25. See id. at 14-16.
26. Id. at 16-17.

1972]

POWER PLANT SITING

_

utility industries have only committed a minute percentage of their
27
resources to research on developing methods of pollution abatement.
The utilities' response to SO2 regulations in recent years has been
to discharge the same quantities of pollutants into less polluted portions
of the atmosphere 2 -- either in the higher elevations reached by tall
smokestacks or in rural areas which previously enjoyed clean air.29 Tall
smokestacks have the drawback of possible conflicts with aviation and
the possibility that emission standards may eventually replace ambient
air quality standards.3 0 The utilities which have not fled from urban
27. Large known reserves of low sulfur coal exist, but utilities face several major
problems in shifting to this source of fuel: (1) recovery costs have been estimated to be
50% greater than medium and high sulfur coals, (2) transportation costs will be higher
because many reserves are located in western America away from most major air pollution centers and not presently competitive with high sulfur coal; low sulfur reserves in
the East are largely owned by steel companies for their own use, (3) existing boilers are
made to take bituminous coal but many low sulfur reserves are sub-bituminous and
thus expensive boiler alterations will be required. See Wall Street J., April 6, 1971,
at 28, col. 2. But, utility reluctance to switch to low sulfur fuels for these reasons
must be somewhat discounted. Technological improvements such as the production of
synthetic gas from coal are possible alternatives. J. EsFosrro, VANISMNG Am 105 (1970).
Further, the Federal Power Commission estimated that in 1968 only 0.23% of industry
operating revenues were going into research. ENERGY PoLcY STAFF, OFFICE OF ScIEN E
AND TECHNOLOGY REPORT ON ELEcrIc PowER AND THE ENVIRONMENT 6 (August 1970) [hereinafter cited as ELEcRuc POwER AND THE ENVIRONMENT]. On August 4, 1971, the federal
government and the coal industry agreed to a $296 million gasification project. The final
cost-sharing formula has not been set but initially the federal government will contribute
$20 million and the coal industry $10 million to construct a demonstration plant. N.Y.
Times, Aug. 4, 1971, at 13, col. 1. The FMC Corporation committed itself to a $250-300
million coal gasification project with the first production estimated in 1976. Wall Street
3. Sept. 1, 1971, at 6, col. 2.
28. Older plants are more expensive to back fit so there is an incentive to phase
out their use for "base loads" in urban areas and to use them only to meet occasional
peak demands. ELECTac POwER AND THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 27, at 12-13.
29.

See Rogers, Tacoma's Tall Stack, THE

NATION,

May 11, 1970, at 553.

30. The current federal strategy to control air pollution from stationary sources is
a combination of national ambient air quality and emissions standards. Clean Air Act of
1970, 42 U.S.C. 1857(c)-4 (Supp. 1971). The 1970 legislation reverses the decision Congress
made in 1967 to rely on regional ambient air quality standards rather than either national
ambient or emissions standards as proposed by President Johnson. The 1967 act was
immediately criticized on the grounds that monitoring standards were not sophisticated
enough to establish ambient air quality standards. See O'Fallon, Deficiencies in the Air
Quality Act of 1967, 33 LAw & CONTEmp. PROB. 275 (1968). Theoretically, the states have
primary responsibility for setting and enforcing standards but the role of the federal
government is considerably more direct and defined. Primary standards are based on
criteria which are "requisite to protect the public health," after allowing "an adequate
margin of safety", 42 U.S.C. 1857(c)-(4)(b)(i) (Supp. 1971). Secondary standards are broader
and are based on the criteria which the EPA determines are necessary to protect the
public welfare from the adverse impacts of the pollutant. Within nine months after the
primary standards have been promulgated the states must present a plan for the enforcement of primary and secondary standards. The plan must obtain the primary standards
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air problems in an upward direction have moved into the less populated
regions of the country. This latter choice is a classical socio-environmen-

tal trade-off dilemma, to wit: should a few Navajos endure air of ordinary Los Angeles quality or should the Los Angeles area contain all
the power plants it needs and approach dangerous levels of air pollution?
C.

LANDSCAPE BLIGHT

The location of plants away from load centers increases the demand

for high voltage transmission corridors. Transmission lines can be
installed underground or under water, but the cost of this is several
times that of overhead installation.3 ' Land values in large cities tend
to neutralize this differential and make underground lines practical,
thus extra high voltage lines running into city centers are generally

subterranean. Formal cost-benefit analysis has not yet derived a satiswithin three years and the secondary standards within a reasonable period of time. The
federal government can substitute its own plan if the state plan does not meet the
statutory requirements; these include adequate enforcement personnel and the requirement
that stationary source owners install monitoring devices. 42 U.S.C. 1857(c)-5 (Supp. 1971).
All new stationary sources must meet federally approved performance standards
which include emission standards that reflect the "degree of emission limitation achieveable through the application of the best system of emission reduction" available, taking
into account the costs of achieving the reduction. 42 U.S.C. 1857(c)-6 (Supp. 1971). The
1970 legislation is based on the premise that Congress should establish standards on the
basis of health protection without regard to the technological feasibility of achieving
them. See Greco, The Clean Air Amendments of 1970: Better Automotive Ideas From
Congress, 1 ENVIRON. AFFAIRS 384, 392 (1971). This section reflects the only concession to
the constraints of technology. A state plan must also include a procedure for pre-construction review of all new sources to which federal performance standards will apply. If
the EPA decides the ambient air quality standards are not applicable to a particular
discharge which may cause "an increase in mortality and an increase in serious irreversible, or incapacitating reversible illness" national emission standards may be established.
42 U.S.C. 1857(c)-7 (Supp. 1971). The EPA has established final national primary ambient
air quality standards for S02. Current Developments, 2 ENVIRON. REP. 3 (1971). But, the
concept of national standards has been attacked by the FPC on the grounds that power
plants may have to be shut down. The EPA has announced that it may follow the policy
of requiring the states to pass standards that cannot be met and allow them a longer
period of time to comply. Id. at 307.
31. The use of overhead lines is advantageous because air provides the insulation
for the conductors and dissipates heat whereas underground lines must be covered with
heavy insulating materials. The industry consistently claims that underground installation costs about ten to fifteen times as much as overhead construction in suburban areas.
THE ELECrITc UTILITY INDUSTRY AND THE ENVIRONMENT 17. In a contested proceeding on
an application to construct overhead Extra High Voltage (EHV) lines across the Connecticut River, the Vermont Public Service Board found that submerged installation
would cost five times as much as the overhead design. Re Vermont Electric Power Co., 81
P.U.R. 3d 510 (Vt. Pub. Svc. Bd. 1969). See generally National Power Survey, Distribution
Technical Advisory Committee, Report of Federal Power Commission 91-92 (1969).
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factory manner of quantifying intangible values such as scenic beauty,
but methods exist to determine the adverse impact of different routes.
Scales have been developed to rank such categories as scenery from
high to low, and although categories cannot be compared among themselves, the method does improve corridor planning by "adding... considerations, revealing their locational characteristics, permitting comparison, disclosing aggregates of social values and costs." 3 2 In addition
to improving the process of identifying alternative corridors, policies
should be developed to encourage the multiple use of rights of way thus
decreasing the amount of land needed for transmission lines.33
III. EXISTING FEDERAL REGULATORY STRUCTURE
In the past, the agencies regulating the production of fuel and energy
have been more concerned with conservation of the supply sources
than with protection of the environment. From a conservation standpoint, the problem is that the fugitive character of a resource like gas
makes it difficult for the market to impose a property system to control
its use. Since each producer has equal access to the supply, but is unable
to exclude other users, there is no incentive to balance present against
future needs; in fact, there is a strong incentive to extract all you can
get now regardless of present requirements.3 4 The danger exists that
the supply will be exhausted in a short period thus inflating prices and
leaving future demands unsatisfied. Conversely, the production of coal
has never been regulated to control supply because coal has not been
classified as a scarce resource, although it is now clear that it is becoming
one.35 Similarly, the production of hydroelectric power has only been

partially regulated because flowing water is a replenishing resource and
there is no need to regulate its use except to protect the public interest
when utilities are given a monopoly over choice sites. 38 Atomic energy
on the other hand has always been a special problem because of the
national security requirements (private industry was not allowed to use
it until 1954), the potential for widespread harm from radiation, and
the limited knowledge about its feasibility for non-military applications.
32. I. McHARG, DESIGN WrrH NATURE 34 (1969).
33. The technical problems are discussed in ELrcrMc PowER AND THE ENMOONMT,
supra note 27, at 22-23.
34. See J. HIscHEIFER, J. DE HAE N & J. MILuAN, WATm SUPPLY: ECONOMICS,
TCHNOLOGY AND POLICY 59-66 (1960).
35. If coal were relied upon as the main source of the world's energy, the supply
would be exhausted in 100 to 200 years. Committee on Resources and Man, National
Academy of Sciences - National Research Council, Resources and Man 205 (1969).
56. See First Iowa Hydro-Electric Coop. v. F.P.C., 328 U.S. 152 (1946).
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As a result the government has maintained extensive control and regu37
lation of its use.
The varying reasons for fuels and energy regulation are reflected
in the existing allocation of jurisdiction and authority between the
federal government and the states. The Federal Power Commission
licenses hydroelectric plants and transmission lines on all navigable
rivers and on non-navigable rivers in cases where the energy will be
transmitted to another state. The Atomic Energy Commission licenses
the construction and design of nuclear reactors and all other parts of
the plant and its operations which involve contact with radioactive
matter.3 8 However, until the recent decision in Calvert Cliffs v. AEC,3 8n
it did not license all aspects of the construction and operation of the
plant; cooling water discharge and the construction of transmission lines
were not subject to AEG jurisdiction. If the plant necessitates the construction of structures in navigable waters such as intake and outfall
structures, a permit must be obtained from the United States Corps of
Engineers.3 9 The applicant must also obtain a state certificate under
Section 21(b) of the Water Quality Improvement Act of 1970 that the
discharge will be in conformity with state water quality standards.
A.

THE FEDERAL POWER COMMISSION

1. Statutory Criterion under Part 1 of the Federal Power Act
The FPC has a broad, comprehensive mandate to license non-federal
hydroelectric projects.40 Section 10(a) of the Federal Power Act requires
that all projects that are licensed:
shall be such as in the judgment of the Commission will be best
adapted to a comprehensive plan for improving or developing a
waterway or waterways for the use or benefit of interstate and
foreign commerce, for the improvement and utilization of waterpower development, and for other beneficial uses, including recreational purposes .... 41
The licensing procedure is characterized by two features: (1) the
37. See Dunlavey, Government Regulation of Atomic Energy, 105 U. PA. L. Rav.
295, 296-300 (1957).
38. 68 Stat. 936, as amended 42 U.S.C. 2131 (1964).
38a. 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971) discussed at page 534 infra.
39. Rivers and Harbors Act, 33 U.S.C. 403 (1964).
In 1967, seven out of 12 large scale fossil fuel plants required a permit from the
Corps. 115 CONG. RaC. S12111 (1969) (remarks of Senator Muskie).
40. 16 U.S.C. 791-823 (1960).
41. 16 U.S.C. 803 (1960).
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decision-makers have discretion to order the priority of 10(a) goals, thus
resolving irreconcilable conflicts that would be presented by equal
consideration of all standards; and (2) the Commission's authority to
implement optimum resource development is limited by the applicant's
willingness and capability to initiate and carry through a project subject to FPC jurisdiction. The Commission has attempted to balance its
role in promoting development to insure an adequate supply of energy
and its planning mandate by issuing licenses subject to environmental
consideration rather than denying licenses on environmental grounds,
except in rare cases. This section will examine the circumstances under
which the Commission has (1) denied applications for environmentallyrelated reasons and (2) issued licenses with conditions dealing with the
environmental effects of the project.
2. Denial of Licenses
The most widely cited case, especially by the FPC, for the proposition
that the FPC can deny a license application for environmental reasons
is Namekagon Hydro Company.42 The Namekagon Hydro Company
sought an application to construct a small 1500 kilowatt (kw) hydroelectric project on the Namekagon River in Wisconsin. The State of
Wisconsin and the Wisconsin Division of the Izaak Walton League
intervened in the FPC proceeding and opposed issuance of the license.
The major issue in the proceeding was whether the proposed project
met the Section 10(a) standard as it was conceded that the project
would provide "the most economical source of power. '43 However,
the Commission noted that construction of the project would impair
use of the Namekagon River for recreation, and that the river was
located in one of the principal recreation areas of the Nation. Accordingly, the license was denied. The Commission did not try to put
a monetary value on the non-power factors on the ground that it would
be futile to do so "if the purpose is to show all that will be affected
if such recreational resources are impaired or destroyed." 44 The decision is especially significant because the Commission did not limit
its opinion to the particular application before it, but instead stated
that "[r]ecreational values are given consideration in every license
45
application before the Commission."
On appeal, the Commission's decision was upheld. 46 The Seventh
42. In re Namekagon Hydro Co., 12 F.P.C. 203 (1953).
43. Id. at 205.

44. Id.
45. Id. at 207.
46. Namekagon Hydro Co. v. FPC, 216 F.2d 509 (7th Cir. 1954).
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Circuit went even further than the Commission in stressing the unique
aspects of the river, especially the safe canoeing available for children
and inexperienced adults, in language seldom seen in the Federal
Reports:
But perhaps the uniqueness of the river is more apparent to
those who take a float trip. Many of such persons are from urban
centers and to see wild life in a natural setting is a thrill indeed.
Such a float trip is exciting as well as peaceful. Passing by heavily
wooded banks on either side, with no noise or sound to be heard
from highways or railroads, the canoeist has the illusion of being
in a forest primeval far from civilization. Each bend of the river is
watched with anticipation for a deer may be seen on the bank, or,
occasionally, a black bear scurrying for the timber. There are very
few, if any comparable stretches of river left in Wisconsin. A canoe
trip on the Namekagon often calls for a repeat performance ....47
The court held that the Commission had the authority under Section
10(a) to deny a license which would threaten "unique recreational
resources."
Namekagon could be read narrowly because it was a small-scale
project, 48 but such a narrow interpretation is not borne out by PUD
No. 1 of Skamania County, Washington, Project No. 2199,40 where
an $11 million project of "moderate economic efficiency" 0° was rejected by the Commission. There was evidence that the project, located on parts of the Columbia River System, would adversely affect
a fish laboratory and two United States Fish and Wildlife hatcheries
costing several million dollars. Additional evidence raised questions
about the possible effects of project construction on fish propagation
and fish disease, but none of it appeared to be very specific. In turning
down the project, the Commission stated that although the evidence
on the danger to the fish "is not susceptible of demonstration with
mathematical precision . . . it clearly reflects substantial hazards."'

The Commission did not attribute its denial of a license to any one
factor, although it conceded that despite the moderate economic efficiency of the applicant's proposed project, "if that were the only issue
we might well grant a conditional license."8 2 However, the dissenting
47. Id. at 512.
48.
L. REv.
49.
50.
51.
52.

Note, FederalPower Commission Control over River Basin Development, 51 VA.
663, 676 (1965).
32 F.P.C. 444 (1964).
Id. at 451.
Id. at 450.
Id.
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opinion indicated that the majority's decision was based on its concern
for the fish:
The majority strikes a stern and rigid pose as to the burden of
proof which applicant must bear, and which, it is asserted, was not
met. But the merest expression of nervousness by the fishery
53
interests and we go all to pieces.
The separate opinion of Commissioner Ross, who voted with the majority, suggests that the fish indeed were the basis for the Commission's
decision. Citing the "epic tragedies which befell the passenger pidgeon,
the buffalo and the whooping crane"5M and the FPC's role "as a trustee
and guardian of the nation's resources to protect the continuing interest of the entire human species in our precious natural resources," 55
Commissioner Ross articulated what obviously bothered the majority
-that "when the hatcheries themselves are threatened, it becomes
incumbent to proceed cautiously .

,,

The adverse effects on the

hatcheries were unsettling because in previous cases the pro-power
applicants had always argued that the fish hatcheries were adequate
57
substitutes for fish runs destroyed by the dams.
3. License Conditions
The Commission often resolves the environment-power dilemma by
granting a conditional license. Such limited approval has been upheld
by the courts as being consistent with the broad authority of the
Commission:55 Section 10 provides, inter alia, that the licensee "shall
53. Id. at 455 (dissent of Commissioner Black).
54. Id. at 451.
55. Id. at 450.
56. Id. at 451.
57. An ironic sidelight to the Skamania case is the fate of the "unique" recreational
opportunity argument presented in Namekagon. In contrast to the latter situation, the
construction of the Skamania project would actually have resulted in a unique, so to
speak, recreational facility for the Pacific Northwest, that is, flat water fishing and water
recreation. In fact, the majority stated, "any loss in stream fishing as a result of the
project would be more than offset by the addition of the boating and lake fishing not now
available." Id. at 448.
58. In United States v. Appalachian Power Co., 311 U.S. 377, 426-27 (1940), the
Court stated:
[I]t cannot properly be said that the constitutional power of the United States
over its waters is limited to control for navigation. By navigation respondent
means no more than operation of boats and improvement of the waterway itself. In truth the authority of the United States is the regulation of commerce
on its waters. Navigability, in the sense just stated, is but a part of this whole....
The respondent cannot, by seeking to use a navigable waterway for power
generation alone, avoid the authority of the Government over the stream. That
authority is as broad as the needs of commerce ....
The licensing conditions to
which objection is made have an obvious relationship to the exercise of the

commerce power. Even if there were no such relationship the plenary power of
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conform to such rules and regulations as the Commission may from
time to time prescribe for it for the protection of life, health, and
property"; that all licenses are to be subject to "such other conditions
not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act as the Commission
may require"; that the Commission shall approve modifications for
project works not in accord with approved plans; and that reimbursement be established by the Commission for headwater benefits and
annual charges to the United States. 59
The Commission has standardized these terms and conditions for
various categories of applicants in sets called "L-forms" 00 which, in
addition to power, include water resource development, navigation
and safety considerations, provisions prescribing water releases "for
beneficial public uses, including recreational purposes",61 the construction and maintenance of fish and wildlife facilities, 02 the free use
of project lands and waterways for the maintenance and operation of
federal fish and wildlife facilities,6 the construction, maintenance and
operation of recreational facilities and modification of project structures and operations as may be requested by federal and state agencies
for recreation,6 4 free public access to project waters and land,0 5 measires to prevent soil erosion, including revegetation of exposed soil
surfaces, 66 disposal of unused timber, brush, refuse and other materials
resulting from project operations,6 7 and the restoration of streams in
case the project is abandoned. 6
The Commission has taken the terms and conditions relating to
recreation, fish and wildlife seriously. It rejected an applicant's arguments that the recreation facilities recommended by the Vermont
Congress over navigable waters would empower it to deny the privilege of constructing an obstruction in those waters. It may likewise grant the privilege on
terms.
59. 16 U.S.C. 803 (1964).
60. Statement of General Policy Providing Citations to L-Forms, Order No. 348,
37 F.P.C. 1037 (1967). The Commission stated that the forms were not binding regulations,
but that the Commission "normally adheres to them ... in issuing subsequent permits
or licenses in similar circumstances."
61. Article 13, Form L-11 (Sept. 1, 1966), 36 F.P.C. 687, 690 (1966).
62. Id. Article 16, at 691.
63. Id. Article 17.
64. Id. Article 18.

65. Id. Article 19. See Rumford Power Co. v. F.P.C., 355 F.2d 683 (Ist Cir. 1966), and
memorandum opinion on remand, Rumford Falls Power Co., Project No. 2333, 36 F.P.C.

605 (1966).
66. Id. Article 20, at 692.
67. Id. Article 22.
68. Id: Article 24.
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Recreation Department were "impractical and too costly in view of
the close proximity of the Lake Champlain area which is highly developed for recreation." 69 And in a case where a newly constructed
dam had changed the conditions on a river, the Commission required
the licensee to build a fish screen costing approximately $200,000 because the California Department of Fish and Game Commission 7O
indicated that "low populations of steelhead make it urgent that con' 71
struction of the screen not be delayed."
In addition to the standard terms and conditions, the Commission's conditioning authority has been used to accommodate an increasing variety of environmental considerationsY2 In the Brazos River
Authority case, the Commission granted a private utility permission
to use project waters to cool steam turbines. 73 However, article 28 of
the license required the licensee to work with the Texas Parks and
Wildlife Agency in developing a method for project operations which
would prevent an increase in the water temperature above a level
which would be detrimental to the fishery and recreational resources. 74
If the licensee and the fish and wildlife agencies could not agree on
criteria, the Commission would reconsider the license after a public
75
hearing.
In Arkansas Power and Light Co.,76 the Commission granted a
license to a utility that was raising the water temperature above the
approved limit, but expressly noted that "interim Commission action
may be taken to meet any demonstrated adverse effects" 7 such as thermal or chemical pollution of the fish and wildlife. Further, the FPC
ordered the licensee to finance a study of the effect of thermal discharge
on fish and wildlife before and after installation and to submit "proposals for protecting the waters of Lake Catherine, and downstream waters
69. Green Mountain Power Corp., Project No. 2513, 41 F.P.C. 64, 65 (1969).
70. Pacific Gas & Electric Co., Project No. 77, 44 F.P.C. 198 (1970).
71. Id. at 198.
72. In Susquenhanna Power Co. and Philadelphia Electric Power Co., Project No.
405; PhiladelphiaElectric Co., Project No. 2355, 32 F.P.C. 826 (1964), the Commission

required the expenditure of funds by the licensee for an archaeological survey, salvage,
and for the donation of 500 acres of land adjacent to the project reservoir for a wildlife
refuge. The fences, food and plant cover for the refuge were to be provided at the li-

censee's expense but the management was provided by the state game commission.
73.

34 F.P.C. 1507 (1965). See also Duke Power Co., Project No. 2503, 36 F.P.C. 675,

681 (1966).
74.

Id. at 1510.

75. Id.
76.
77.

40 F.P.C. 522, 523 (1968).
Id. at 523 (emphasis added).
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and fish and wildlife resources .... "7 8 The Commission said that if the
licensee failed to cure any adverse effects on the fish or wildlife (either
during or after the study), it would order remedial action upon request
79
or on its own motion.
A separate statement summarized the three substantive issues that
had been decided in Arkansas Power: (1) the FPC can impose requirements with respect to thermal pollution; (2) these requirements can be
"more stringent than those specified by the Federal Water Pollution
Control Administration or by other federal or state agencies having
authority regarding such matters-either as a legal or as a practical
matter"; and (3) the FPC stood ready to act, "whenever such action, in
its independent judgment, is required in the interest of comprehensive
development."8' 0
4. JudicialExpansion of the Commission's Duty to Consider Environmental Impacts
The extent to which the courts will allow the Commission to exercise
its discretion in evaluating the environmental issues presented by an
application for a license has not yet been settled. In Washington Department of Game v. FPC,81 the Ninth Circuit held:
As we see it, it is not within our jurisdiction to prescribe a
policy ....If the dams will destroy the fish industry of the river,
we are powerless to prevent it... . If it is the law (and we are not
holding one way or another) that the Commission is held to the
use of discretion in its requirements as to the preservation of any
use to which a navigable stream is currently being put, we hold
that the Commission has given the subject of the fishing industry
82
due consideration and has not abused its discretion.
However, in Scenic Hudson,3 Consolidated Edison of New York,
a utility serving the New York City area, filed an application with the
FPC to build a 2,000 MW
pumped storage project on the Hudson
River. Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference, a local citizens' organization, intervened in the proceedings in order to represent the public's
interest in esthetics and conservation, allegedly in jeopardy because
78.
79.

Id. at 524.
Id.

80. Id. at 525.
81. 207 F.2d 391 (9th Cir. 1953).
82. Id. at 398 (emphasis added).
83. Scenic Hudson Preservation Conf. v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied,

384 U.S. 941 (1966).
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of the project. The FPC licensed the project but the conference appealed to the Second Circuit and won a major victory. The court ruled
that the Commission could not remain passive as to alternatives to the
applicant's pumped storage plant, especially in light of the project's
location "in an area of unique beauty and major historical significance."
The court found the record incomplete with regard to the alternative
ways the utility might procure power, the effects of such alternatives,
the esthetic advantages of underground transmission lines vis-h-vis their
economic disadvantages (i.e., high cost), and the danger to the fish. The
court remanded the proceedings and added:
The Commission's renewed proceedings must include as a basic
concern the preservation of natural beauty and of national historic
shrines, keeping in mind that, in our affluent society, the cost of a
project is only one of several factors to be considered.8 4
In its decision, the court reminded the Commission that Section 10(a)
"undoubtedly encompasses the conservation of natural resources, the
maintenance of natural beauty, and the preservation of historic sites,"
and that the Act seeks to protect non-economic as well as economic
interests. s5
In Udall v. FPCSS the United States Supreme Court went even
further and indicated its reluctance to accept a record unless the Commission gave extensive consideration to the benefits of not constructing
a proposed project. Mr. Justice Douglas, writing for the majority,
remanded because the Commission did not sufficiently explore the
issue of federal development, and (in dictum) because the Commission
did not consider the question of "whether deferral of construction
would be more in the public interest than immediate construction and
whether preservation of the reaches of the river affected would be more
desirable and in the public interest than the proposed development."88
Thus, environmental issues must be considered not only in relation to
alternative projects but also in relation to the benefits of no project.
The Court stated: "We cannot assume that the Act commands the
immediate construction of as many projects as possible."' 7,
There is some question as to the source of the Commission's authority to deny a license application on the ground that a deferral of
84.
85.
85a.
86.
87.

Id. at 624.
354 F.2d at 616.
387 U.S. 428 (1967).
Id. at 449.
Id.
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the construction would be more in the public interest than immediate
development." In the Udall opinion, Mr. Justice Douglas supported
his ruling by citing the Wildlife Coordination Act of 1958. This act
requires the Fish and Wildlife Service of the Department of the Interior
to determine whether fish life will be threatened by a federal project
and to consult with the agency licensing or undertaking the development to determine if adverse environmental impacts may materialize.8 0
Justice Douglas' emphasis on this statute suggests that courts have an
important role in harmonizing conflicting legislative policies in situations where the legislature has failed to order priorities. 90 A statute
88. The traditional ground for denial of a license or postponement of consideration

of a license application is congressional enactment of specific legislation. In Arizona
Power Authority, the Commission issued an order halting the licensing process in direct
response to special legislation suspending the FPC's authority to issue any license or to
accept for filing any applications for licenses or permits within the affected reach of the
river for two years. Arizona Power Authority, Project No. 2248; City of Los Angeles and
its Department of Water and Power, Project No. 2272, 32 F.P.C. 736 (1964). The proposed
project would have backed up waters into the Grand Canyon area and was a highly
sensitive political issue from the viewpoint of the conservationists, the irrigation interests,
and the California water interests. Since the Arizona Power case, similar bills have been
introduced to halt proceedings affecting projects on the Snake and Hudson rivers.
89. Historically the Corps limited its responsibility to protecting the navigable
capacity of waters subject to its jurisdiction. In 1958 it was required to consult with
the Fish and Wildlife Service of the Department of the Interior, 16 U.S.C. 662 (1970)
and in 1967 a coordination procedure was devised by the Departments of the Army and
Interior to provide more systematic environmental information to the Corps. 33 C..R.
§ 209.120(d)(11) (1970). In Zabel v. Tabb, 430 F.2d 199 (5th Cir. 1970), it was held that
a permit could be denied for ecological reasons and the Corps has revised its regulations
to reflect a more expanded mission. Proposed filling and dredging operations will be
evaluated in terms of the project's impact on the public interest which includes "navigation, fish and wildlife, conservation, pollution, aesthetics, ecology. . . ." 33 C.F.R. § 209.120
(d)(1) (1970). The portion of a power plant covered by a permit is usually only a small
part of the total project. Therefore the Corps permit is not the ideal stage for review
of all the environmental impacts of a proposed plant. Its most zealous supporters recognize this by defending it as a means of collaterally attacking an environmentally unsound project. The permit's utility for this purpose is somewhat weakened by the Corp's
regulations on public hearings. See Castro, The Use of the Corps of Engineers Permit as
a Tool for Defending the Environment, 11 NAT. RES. J. 1 (1971). Public hearings are not
required prior to issuing a permit; but regulations provide that a hearing shall be held
"whenever there appears to be sufficient public interest to justify such action. In case
of doubt, a public hearing should be held." 33 C.F.R. § 209.120(g)(1) (1970). Notice of a
permit application is sent to federal departments such as the Department of the Interior
and state and local governments. 33,C.F.R. § 209.120(f (1970).
90. Expanded theories of judicial review as illustrated by Udall may be based on
the deeper premise that the "public interest" or "common good" is not something that
can be easily determined. Democratic decision-making requires that a decision cannot be
considered legitimate unless the decision-maker has fully considered the impact of the
choice on alternative claimants for the resource even though they are not formally before
him. These ideas are drawn from J. BUCHANAN & G. TuLLocK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT
(1962) (esp. ch. 8); and Krutilla, Conservation Reconsidered, 57 Am. EcoN. REv. 777 (1967).
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such as the Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act is evidence that the
legislature considers the protection of environmental values more
important than development in certain instances. Further, while the
Court cannot usurp this decision-making process from the Commission
(because Congress has delegated such authority to that agency), the
Court can further the policy of the legislature by requiring a more
complete record than would be necessary under traditional rules of
administrative law. Thus to establish a prima facie case, an applicant
must now demonstrate that the license will be consistent with congressional policy as expressed in other relevant legislation. The National
Environmental Policy Act of 1969 now mandates the kind of record
required in Scenic Hudson and Udall; thus, the courts have the task of
formulating standards to separate pro forma from in-depth consideration of environmental impacts and alternatives.
B.

THE ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION

The Atomic Energy Commission is charged with two potentially conflicting roles-the promotion and the regulation of nuclear power.91
91.

To explore fully the consequences of this dual mission is beyond the scope of

this article, but a recognition of the AEC's potentially conflicting roles is necessary to
understand the history of their attitude toward the regulation of the environmental
side effects of nuclear plants. The Commission is sensitive to this criticism and has
restructured its licensing procedure to achieve a higher degree of separation between the
developmental, promotional and regulatory aspects of the Commission's mission. License
applications are reviewed by the Commission's regulatory staff, the three member Atomic
Safety and Licensing Boards and the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS).
10 C.F.R. § 21 et seq. (1970). The licensing boards consist of technical and legal personnel
drawn from outside the AEC's staff and issue an initial decision on each application
after a public hearing. A hearing is not held unless the technical staff recommends the
issuance of a license. A decision may be appealed first to the Licensing Appeals Board
and then to the Commission. The ACRS is also independent; it "is required by law to
conduct an independent safety review of each power reactor license application" and is
"a prestigious body representing the various disciplines required for a thorough consideration of nuclear safety matters." 1969 Atomic Energy Hearing, supra note 1, at 123.
The separation of the Commission's promotional and regulatory activities are not as complete as the structure would suggest. The commissioners maintain control over both
regulation and research and development. And, the relationship between the Commission
and the scientific community is a complex web of shared values, friendships and consultantships. Special criticism has arisen over these apparently close ties so that reliance
on outside scientists to review and issue initial license applications does not insure
impartiality. See Like, Multi-Media Confrontation-The Environmentalists Strategy for
a "No-Win" Agency Proceeding, 13 ATomic ENERGY Lj. 1, 2-5 (1971) for a critique of

AEC licensing. See also Green, Safety Determinations in Nuclear Power Licensing: A
Critical View, 43 Nonam DAan LAw. 633 (1968). The AEC has resisted proposals to separate
regulation from development completely on the ground that there is "a vital need for
a high degree of communication between the regulatory organization and ...

in research and development

.

.

"

those ...

in order to facilitate the exchange of information.
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Under the AEC's licensing process the applicant must first obtain a
construction permit which gives the Commission the opportunity to
review the site and design plans. After construction, the applicant
petitions for a final operating license, and the Commission then determines whether the plant has been constructed in accordance with the

permit and whether the operation will be consistent with AEC policy
92
and regulations.
The Commission originally took the position that Section 2(e)0 3
of the Atomic Energy Commission Act of 1954 confines their jurisdiction to questions concerning the use of nuclear power for common defense and security, and to questions of radiological health and
safety with respect to the special hazards associated with the operation of nuclear facilities. 94 Thus, evidence on other environmental
hazards, such as thermal pollution, have been excluded from licensing
proceedings. However, the Commission has periodically attempted to
coordinate its licensing proceedings with other governmental agencies
directly charged with related regulation. For example, in 1964 the
Commission executed a memorandum of understanding with the
Department of Interior whereby the Commission would furnish the
Fish and Wildlife Service with copies of license applications so that the
Service could comment thereon. But such attempts at coordination have
generally failed. One such failure occurred when, in 1965 the Hempstead Land Resources Council filed a petition for intervention alleging
that Consolidated Edison's Indian Point reactor would cause, in the
Commission's words, "so-called thermal pollution." The Commission
dismissed the petition on the grounds that the objection was not based
on consideration of radiological safety, and noted that: "We are not
called upon to decide the extent to which the contentions of the Council
may fall within the areas of responsibility of other Federal, State or local
authorities."95
1969 Atomic Energy Hearings,supra note 1,at 137 (statement of Commissioner Ramey).
This view is supported by Professor Davis. Davis, Nuclear Facilities Licensing; Another

View, 110 U. PA. L. Rxv. 371 (1962). The other view is that of Professor David Cavers
who argues for the creation of independent reviewing board to review all license applications, not to resolve scientific questions "but to check judgments--judgments on interrelated scientific, technological, and policy questions." Cavers, Administrative Decisionmaking in Nuclear FacilitiesLicensing, 110 U. PA. L. REv. 330, 359 (1962). Experience has
demonstrated the correctness of Professor Cavers' arguments.

92. 42 U.S.C. 2235 (1970). For purposes of the act a construction permit is a license.
93.
94.
95.
Central

42 U.S.C. 2012(e) (1964).
1968 Thermal Pollution Hearings,supra note 18, pt. 3 at 975.
See In re Consolidated Edison Co., 3 A.E.C. 62, 63 (1965). See also In re Jersey
Power & Light Company, 2 A.E.C. 446 (1964) (initial decision), affirmed 2 A.E.C.
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In October, 1967 Commissioner James T. Ramey recommended
the establishment of a "broadly based Federal Interdepartmental committee on electric power plant siting to develop a coordinated approach
to the planning of ways to handle the problems affecting siting." 96 This
resulted in the preparation of two reports by the White House Energy
Policy Staff which were released in 1968 and 1970. These reports have
formed the basis of federal power plant siting and energy planning
policy. However, developments in the courts and in Congress between
1968 and the present have outpaced the efforts of the federal government to deal with the problem through the cumbersome process of
interagency coordination or the establishment of a completely new
regulatory system.
The AEC's limited jurisdictional position was litigated and affirmed by the First Circuit in New Hampshire v. AEC, 97 a case now less
important for its holding than for the legislative reforms it generated.
An investor-owned electric utility consortium decided to construct a
generating plant in Vernon, Vermont on the Connecticut River across
from New Hampshire and four miles above the Massachusetts boundary. Initial plans projected discharges which would raise the temperature of the receiving water by 200. All three states were undertaking a
a salmon restoration program in the Connecticut River which would
have been impaired by the discharge; other species were similiarly
threatened with extinction. At the time construction plans were disclosed, none of the states had their thermal water quality standards
approved by the Secretary of the Interior, and, moreover, were considering conflicting standards. For example, because Vermont planned to
permit mixing zones, the allowable temperature limits would be calculated downstream from the discharge under its standards. New
Hampshire, however, did not plan to allow mixing zones and thus the
temperature would have to conform to the standards at the point of
discharge. s Because no effective interstate regulatory mechanism
existed to consider state thermal policies before construction of the
Rep. 28 (1965). Cf. Hearings on H.R. 4148, supra note 16, at 408 for description of
evolution of Interior-AEC coordination.
As criticism of the Commission's limited concept of their jurisdiction mounted,
AEC continued to adhere rigidly to their construction of section 2(e) but did ask
comment from other federal agencies on other possible environmental hazards of
plant they were licensing.

the
the
for
the

96. 1969 Atomic Energy Hearing, supra note 1, at 125.
97. 406 F.2d 170 (Ist Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 962 (1969).
98. 1968 Thermal Pollution Hearings, supra note 18, pt. I at 330 (statement of

Peter Shapiro, Assistant Attorney General, New Hampshire).

526

SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45:502

plant, the states placed primary reliance on joint intervention before
the AEC to accomplish the necessary regulation. However, Vermont,
where the plant was located, proceeded to prepare its thermal standards
and to study the costs and benefits of installing cooling towers in the
plant. In mid-1967 Vermont Yankee applied to the Vermont Water
Resources Board for a license to construct the plant, after some "prodding" by the state. 99 When it became clear that the plant could not meet
the thermal standards that Vermont had submitted to the Secretary of
the Interior, they agreed to construct two cooling units consisting of 11
towers. 100 At this point Vermont and Massachusetts withdrew from the
AEC Proceedings but New Hampshire, which had not yet adopted
standards, pressed on with the litigation.
The Atomic Energy Act requires the Commission to consider the
"health and safety of the public"'' 1 in licensing projects and New
Hampshire argued that these words be given "their present day plain
meaning." This, the court admitted, would confer jurisdiction, but
they found that the history of the 1954 Atomic Energy Act indicated
that Congress intended to deal only with the special hazards of radioactivity and that the agency's construction had been confirmed by
subsequent Congresses. The evidence of Congressional confirmation
was that bills to broaden jurisdiction had been introduced but not
passed and, more significantly, that the Commission's construction of
the Act was consistent with that of the Joint Committee on Atomic
Energy. The Joint Committee is required to make "continuing studies
of the activities of the Atomic Energy Commission and of problems
02
relating to the development, use and control of Atomic Energy.'
However, a very intimate relationship has developed between the Committee and the Commission; Joint Committe hearings are as nonadversary as one is likely to find in Washington. The court did not
refer to this fact stating only: "[W]e note the very special relationship,
crystallized in statutory form between the Commission and the Joint
Committee on Atomic Energy-a relationship that is rarely embodied
in positive law.' ' 03
99. Id. at 317-21 (Statement of James L. Oakes, Attorney General, Vermont).
100. The hearing before the Vermont Water Resources Board is summarized in id.
at 424-30.
101. 42 U.S.C. 2232(a) (1970). Neither the act nor the commission's regulations define
these terms. See Green, supra note 94, at 635-37.
102. 42 U.S.C. 2252 (1970).
103. 406 F.2d at 174. In Power Reactor Development Corp. v. International Union
of Electrical Workers, 367 U.S. 396, 409 (1961), the Court said that there were special
reasons to defer to the refusal of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy to expand the
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It is easy to criticize the court for failing, in their own words, to
close "a serious gap between the dangers of modem technology and
the protections afforded by law.. ."104 when the statute did not expressly
prohibit them from doing so. The case raises important questions about
the limits of statutory construction as a means of inducing an agency
to undertake new regulatory programs. There is a difference between
an agency which is straining to expand its jurisdiction and needs only
court approval to undertake a program, and one which is reluctant to
regulate. The AEC's position on thermal discharges is an example of
the latter and sound principles of public administration suggest that
the court consider carefully the consequences of expanding the agency's
jurisdiction. There is a high risk that the agency will not alter its basic
priorities and that an ineffective regulatory program will be generated
by a well meaning court.10 5 Further, a court decision may lessen
legislative incentive to design more optimum regulatory mechanisms.
The Congressional response to the problems posed by New Hampshire v. AEC was to amend the Federal Water Pollution Control Act
in 1970 to provide:
Any applicant for a Federal license or permit to conduct
activity including, but not limited to, the construction or operation of facilities, which may result in any discharge into the navigable waters of the United States, shall provide the licensing or
permitting agency a certification from the State in which the discharge originates or will originate, or, if appropriate, from the
interstate water pollution control agency having jurisdiction over
the navigable waters at the point where the discharge originates
or will originate, that there is reasonable assurance, as determined
by the State or interstate agency that such activity will be conducted in a manner which will not violate applicable water quality
standards.1 08
If certification is denied, no federal permit or license can issue. The
requirement can be waived only if the state or interstate agency fails to
act "within a reasonable period of time (which shall not exceed one
year)." 07
Commission's jurisdiction because of the "peculiar responsibility and place" of the committee in the statutory scheme of an untried and new program.
104. 406 F.2d at 178.
105. See Caldwell, Administrative Possibilities for Environment Control in FuTusm
ENViRONMENTs OF NORTH AmmRIcA 666-67 (F. Darling & J. Milton eds. 1966), for a discussion of the relationship reordering priorities and the design of new regulatory procedures.
106. 33 U.S.C. 1171(b)(1) (1970).
107. The amendment also contains a mechanism to protect the interests of other
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The two significant features of this section are the choice of state
rather than federal agencies as the primary enforcement mechanism,
and the compliance standards the applicant must meet to obtain state
certification. The Department of Interior's initial proposal would have
provided that each federal agency could not license a facility until the
agency had received a report from the Secretary of Interior on the
facility's effect on water quality standards. Thus, the agency, and not
the Department, would have had the power to require "such measures
as it deems appropriate"'' 08 to insure compliance. By placing primary
responsibility on the states, the amendment rejects the argument that
the solution to a constructive administrative policy is simply to add to
the list of criteria a federal agency must take into account in the licensing process. This solution recognizes that expanding an agency's
jurisdiction, or even broadening the burden it must meet in considering
an application does not deal with the more fundamental problem-to
re-order the agency's priorities away from the notion that environmental considerations will remain secondary to the principal mission of
providing adequate energy supplies to meet rapidly increasing demands.
The requirement that the state agency certify only that the licensee
will comply with water quality standards represents a compromise
between the views of Senator Muskie and the utility industry on the
standards necessary for certification. Senator Muskie would have required the utilities to obtain both a pre-construction and a pre-operation
permit. The utilities argued that such a process would unduly delay the
construction of needed plants because it added a needless administrative
step. As finally passed, the amendment section 21(b) provides that the
initial certificate will be valid for all federal agencies from whom a
license must be obtained, unless the state certifying authority notifies
the federal agency
. .. that there is no longer reasonable assurance that there will
be compliance with applicable water quality standards because of
changes .. . in (A) the construction or operation of the facility,
(B) the characteristics of the waters into which such discharge is
states which may be affected by the discharge but are not represented in an interstate
agency. After the licensing agency has received the application and certification It must
notify the Secretary of the Interior. If he decides that the discharge may affect another
state, he must notify the other state or states within 30 days. The state(s) then have 60
days to decide if they desire a hearing before the agency, to which they are entitled as a
matter of right. At the hearing both the affected state and the secretary will present
their recommendations. This section was inserted by the Hose-Senate Conference and
leaves the duty of the licensing agency somewhat unclear.
108. S. 7, Sec. 14(b), 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
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made, or (C) the water quality standards applicable to such waters.
This paragraph shall be inapplicable in any case where the applicant for such operating license or permit has failed to provide the
certifying State, or if appropriate, the interstate agency of the
Administrator, with notice of any proposed changes in the construction or operation of the facility with respect to which a
construction license or permit has been granted which changes
may result in violation of applicable water quality standards.109
Although this compromise lightens the paperwork involved in
certification, it puts the burden of stopping the federal licensing process completely upon the states. If a state chooses not to intervene
through pre-operational review, the federal agency has no further duty
to hesitate in granting the license. Under the original concept, the
burden would have been on the utility to obtain the second certification
before federal licensing could be had and before the plant could be put
into operation. Further, the amendment works to constrain a state
from exercising caution in those situations where it must make its
certification decision with only limited information about the ecological
effects of the utility.
STATE ENFORCEMENT OF THERMAL STANDARDS

Senator Muskie's theory was that, consistent with federal legislation

which places the primary responsibility for formulating and enforcing
standards on the states, state environmental agencies ought to have the
primary responsibility for setting those standards. 110 In placing the
primary responsibility for enforcement of thermal water quality standards"' on the states, Section 21(b) has two major defects. First, it
means that the federal government can only bring a judicial action
(which is really the culmination of a long series of hearings aimed at
securing industry compliance) after a violation occurs;" 2 even then, it
109. 33 U.S.C. 1171(b)(3) (1970).
110. 33 U.S.C. 1160 (1970). See Hines, Nor Any Drop to Drink: Public Regulation
of Water Quality, PartIII: The FederalEffort, 52 IowA L. REv. 799 (1967).

111. A water quality standard consists of three basic elements: (1) a description of
the desired beneficial use of the water, (2) criteria which are the scientific parameters
necessary to support the beneficial use, and (3) an implementation plan. U.S. DEPARTMENT
OF INTERIOR, FEDERAL WATER POLLUTION CONTROL ADMINISTRATION

GUIDELINES FOR ESrAB-

LISHING WATER QUALITY STANDARDS FOR INTERSTATE WATERS (1967).

112.

If the Administration of the EPA believes that pollution from a source in one

state is endangering the inhabitants of another state, he may call a conference on his
own motion. If the pollution is confined to one state, a conference can only be called
at the request of that state's governor. The conference is a public proceeding which
attempts to obtain a consensus on proposed standards and abatement schedules. If the
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has limited authority to initiate such actions without the consent of the
state. Second, state regulatory programs are not equipped to carry the
initiative given them under the federal act.
Prior to the passage of the Water Quality Act of 1966 few states
had an active thermal pollution control program and there was no
clear federal policy to which the states could look for advice.1 13 Indeed,
even today there is sharp debate over the standards to be applied. The
Environmental Protection Agency has avoided the establishment of a
firm thermal standards policy. Instead, they have preferred to negotiate
agreements with utilities, as they did in the case of Lake Michigan, that
11
cooling towers will be constructed for all future plants. 3
The drafting and enforcement of thermal quality standards
present several serious problems. It is possible to establish general
parameters for such standards, such as the maximum average daily
temperature rise which will be permitted. However, because of the
variations in both surface and flow characteristics of bodies of water,
thermal criteria must be individually established for each site1 4 and
must be coordinated for large reaches of a stream or estuary. For example, many states allow a mixing zone within the immediate vicinity
of a plant and only require that the discharge meet the standards outside this zone. However, if two plants on either side of a river are
permitted a mixing zone one-half the width of the stream, a thermal
block can be created which might prevent fish from reaching up-stream
spawning grounds. Thus, the effectiveness of the state's enforcement
programs depends not only upon the standards adopted but also upon
the quality of the program's administration1ltI
EPA Administrator believes that "effective progress" is not being made as a result of
the conference, he can recommend appropriate action to the state control agency. If,
after a six month period, he is dissatisfied with the implementation of his recommendation, he may proceed to the hearing stage before a board appointed by the Secretary.
The hearing is a more focused inquiry on specific pollution and the board may make
remedial recommendations to the Administrator if it finds effective progress in abatement
is not occuring. The Secretary then sends the findings and recommendations to the pollutors along with a notice specifying a reasonable time which cannot be less than six
months to secure abatement. If abatement measures have not been undertaken after the
period of time set after the hearing, he may request the Attorney General to bring suit
under the same conditions he can call a conference. See Comment, FederalPrograms For
Water Pollution Control, I U.C.D.L. REv. 71, 88-92 (1969).
113. FEDERAL WATER POLLUTION CONTROL ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THM
INTERIOR, REPORT OF THE COMMrrTEE ON WATER QUALITY CRITERIA

(1968).

113a. See PEOPLE, POWER AND POLLUTION, supra note 11, at 40-41 for a case history of

the controversy.
114. See Comment, Thermal Electric Power and Water Pollution: A Siting Approach,
46"IND. L.J. 61, 84-90 (1970).
115. The National Technical Advisory Committee recommended that the temperature
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Furthermore, thermal quality standards are especially vulnerable
to judicial attack on the grounds that they are unreasonable. 1 6 Courts
have required a showing that probable injury to a beneficial use will
result from the discharge and, absent such a showing, have found that
the discharge does not constitute pollution because the injury is specu7
lative.11
Finally, thermal discharge regulation is complicated because states
often do not have adequate technical information to assess a proposed
discharge. To set thermal standards for a given site, it is not only
necessary to know the theoretical effects of a discharge, but it is also
necessary to determine the specific effects on the receiving waters in
question. The variable nature of streams and estuaries makes it difficult
to generalize-especially if only laboratory studies are used to support
the standards."" Even if field work has been done, it may not be the
criteria apply only outside a mixing zone but provided that: "Mixing should be accomplished as quickly as possible through the use of devices which insure that the waste is
mixed with allocated dilution of water in the smallest possible area." To avoid thermal

blocks they proposed:
It is essential that adequate passageways be provided at all times for the
movement or drift of the biota. Water quality criteria favorable to the aquatic
community must be maintained at all times in these passageways. It is recognized,
however, that certain areas of mixing are unavoidable. These create harmfully
polluted areas and for this reason it is essential that they be limited in width
and length and be provided only for mixing. The passage zone must provide
favorable conditions and must be in a continuous stretch bordered by the same
bank for a considerable distance to allow safe and adequate passage up and down
the stream, reservoir, lake or estuary for free-floating and drift organisms.
The width of the zone and the volume of flow in it will depend on the
character and size of the stream or estuary. Area, depth, and volume of flow
must be sufficient to provide a usable and desirable passageway for fish and other
aquatic organisms. Further, the cross-sectional area and volume of flow in the
passageway will largely determine the percentage of survival of drift organisms.
Therefore, the passageway should contain preferably 75 percent of the crosssectional area and/or volume of flow of the stream or estuary.
In 1968 Florida proposed to allow a "reasonable mixing zone" for a discharge in
Biscayne Bay, which had naturally reached the upper tolerance level of many species, but
at the time Florida Power and Light applied for a discharge permit it did not have

sufficient data on which to define the zone.
116. Note, Water Quality Standards in Private Nuisance Actions, 79 YALE L.J. 102,
107-09 (1970).
117. See Reserve Mining Co. v. Minnesota, 2 ERC 1155 (D. Minn. 1970) which held
it would be speculative to classify the discharge of tailings pollution under Minn. Stat.
§ 115.01, subd. 5 which referred to "actual or Potential" pollution (emphasis added). The
only evidence of impairment of a beneficial use of the water was "the increased display of
the 'green water phenomenon' and the disappearance of a proportion of the scud, a small
shell creature which serves as food for smelt and small trout." Id. at 1144. See also
North Suburban San. S. Dist. v. Water Pollution Con. Comm'n, 281 Minn. 524, 162
N.W.2d 249 (1968).
118. Studies may be based on acute rather than chronic conditions so that they tell
what will happen to a species if it is subject to a rapid temperature rise but not what will
occur in adjustment to a gradual temperature rise. Biologists have charged that studies
based on acute data are safer than one might hope. McWhinnie, The American Public and
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type which will tell an administrator whether a discharge will be harmful."x9 This can create a vicious circle-often the only way to tell if a
proposed discharge will be harmful is to monitor it, and unless there
is a clear case of potential damage (e.g., if the water temperature was
already approaching the lethal limit of a species) the state agency is
forced to approve the permit with the condition that the utility finance
monitoring studies.
These difficulties in regulating thermal discharges suggest that
the burden of proving the harmlessness of the discharge should be
placed on the utilities. Professor Willard Hurst has argued that developers have been protected by placing the burden of proof on protesters
because of a notion that development is beneficial to society and thus
should be encouraged. 20 Today, however, we are suspicious about
unrestrained technological development because we know too little
about its second order consequences. Thus, it seems proper to shift the
burden of proof to the initiator. But, thp consequences of this shift
need to be better understood. In many instances it is unreasonable to
require a utility to prove that its discharge will not be harmful since
the effects of the discharge on specific waters often cannot be determined. No reputable scientist will testify in advance that a proposed
discharge positively will or will not be harmful. 121 Scientific criticism
of projected damage studies generally concludes that the study was not
comprehensive enough or still leaves too many variables unknown.
Nevertheless, because the effects may be irreversible, the utility should
be required to produce the best scientific information available and
should undertake further studies if the regulatory body decides that
current information is inadequate.' 22 This shift in the burden to prothe Pingpong Game, Power Production & Protection of the Lake Proceedings,2ND ANNUAL!
CONF. ON LAKE MICHIGAN (Open Lands Project, 1970).
119. "Traditionally, estuarine studies by various laboratories were oriented towards
understanding distribution and life history aspects of single species, usually a recrea-

FOUR-STATE

tionally or commercially important species." Mihursky, Natural Resources Institute Special
Report No. 1, PATUxENT THERMAL STUDIES 3 (1969).
120. J. HURST,LAW AND ECONOMIC GROwTH 224 (1964) quoted in Krier, Environmental
Litigation and the Burden of Proof, in LAw AND THE ENVIRONMENT 105, 107 (1970). See also
Hanks, The Right To a Habitable Environment, in THE RIGHTS OF AMERICANS 146, 154
(1970).
121. "I do not think there is any scientist in the world that could design a program
that would be statistically foolproof that would show every change that occurred and
separate those changes from natural occurring changes and those produced by power

plants and any other industry." 1968 Thermal Pollution Hearings, supra note 18, pt. 2
at 709 (statement of Dr. Ruth Patrick, biologist).

122. Some states have done this either by regulation or practice. New York places the
burden of proof on the discharger to establish that requirements are "unnecessarily
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duce evidence should help identify cases where there is a high risk that
a beneficial use will be impaired, define more sharply the risks that
the discharge poses, and, if combined with a required post-discharge
monitoring program, should serve to place the utility on notice that
modifications in its plant operation or design may be required.
D.

THE EvFEcr

OF THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY

ACT

OF 1969 ON AEC JURISDICTION

The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA) contains
both a long range and highly abstract statement of national objectives,
and standards and procedures for the administration of existing programs. To implement the act each agency is required to file an environmental impact statement with the Council on Environmental Quality
when "legislative proposals" or "other major federal action" are
involved. 123 The important question for power plant siting problems
is whether NEPA reverses New Hampshire v. AEC and thus requires
the AEC to consider thermal effects in its licensing. The relevant section, 102(c), ambiguously requires only that "to the fullest extent
possible" federal policies, regulations and public laws "shall be interpreted and administered in accordance with the policies . . ." of
NEPA.124
The relationship between section 21(b) and NEPA was specifically
considered in the Senate because the two pieces of legislation emerged
at the same time from separate committees. Senator Muskie stated that
deference to state water quality agencies was necessary because federal
agencies like the AEC "have always emphasized their primary responsibility making environmental considerations secondary in their view.
. . . By requiring compliance certification from the water pollution
control agency... [the section] would assign policing responsibliity to
those agencies qualified to make an environmental decision and not
25
those committed to carrying out other functions at minimum cost."'
Section 102(c) of NEPA was amended in conference to delete the
requirement that federal agencies make a finding of the detrimental
restrictive" in that modification would not impair their effectiveness under the best
usage classifications established by the state. New York Criteria Governing Thermal
Discharges, 6 NYCRR 704.2, reprinted in 2 ENvIRON. REI. STATE WATER LAws 861:0602.
Maryland has also placed the burden of producing information on utilities. See Hearings
on S.2752 Before the Subcomm. on Intergovernmental Relations of the Senate Comm. on

Government Operations, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., at 144 (1970).
128. 42 US.C. 4321 et seq. (1971).
124. 42 U.S.C. 4332 (1970).
125. 115 CONG. Rim. S2111 (1969).
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environmental impact statement. In Senator Jackson's words, "the
compromise .

.

. provides that the licensing agency will not have to

make a detailed statement on water quality if the State or other appropriate agency has made a certification....
The compromise

27

was considered in a recently decided case,

Calvert Cliffs Coordinating Committee v. AEC. 28 In Calvert Cliffs,
Judge J. Skelly Wright sought to do what the court in New Hampshire

v. AEC had eschewed-that is, to transform the AEC into an environmental protection agency. Fully cognizant of the Commission's lack of
"over-enthusiasm" for implementing NEPA, Judge Wright held that
NEPA requires the AEC to make its own determination of the thermal
impacts of a plant and empowers it to impose, if it desires (and, he
indicated, he hoped that it would), standards stricter than those imposed
by the state certifying agency. Calvert Cliffs is premised on a newly
emerging theory of the role of public interest developed in Scenic
Hudson. It specifically rejects a traditional theory of administrative

law which confines the court's role to ensuring that parties before the
agency were accorded procedural due process. 29 It further implicitly
distinguishes between those agencies which dispense benefits on a caseby-case basis and those with broad planning mandates to make political
choices which require a "finely tuned and 'systematic' balancing" of
interests such as environmental protection and technology.'3 0
Judge Wright summarized NEPA and concluded that sections
102(2)(c) and (d) (which require impact statements and the study of
126. Id.
127. Initial suits urging that the AEC has jurisdiction were dismissed on the
grounds that no final order had been issued by the Commission in the licensing proceeding. Thermal Ecology Must Be Preserved v. AEC, 433 F.2d 524 (D.C. Cir. 1970) and
Lloyd Harbor v. Seaborg, No. 70 Civ. 1253 (E.D.N.Y. April 2, 1971).

128. 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
129. See EDF, Inc. v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584, 597-98 (D.C. Cir. 1971):
Strict adherence to that requirement [that administrators articulate the factors on
which they base their decisions] is especially important now that the character
of administrative litigation is changing. As a result of expanding doctrines of
standing and reviewability, and new statutory causes of action, courts are increasingly asked to review administrative action that touches on fundamental personal
interests in life, health, and liberty. These interests have always had a special
claim to judicial protection, in comparison with the economic interests at stake
in a ratemaking or licensing proceeding.
To protect these interests from administrative arbitrariness, it is necessary,
but not sufficient, to insist on strict judicial scrutiny of administrative action....
Judicial review must operate to ensure that the administrative process itself will
confine and control the exercise of discretion ....
When administrators provide
a framework for principled decision-making, the result will be to diminish the
importance of judicial review by enhancing the integrity of the administrative
process ....
(Citations omitted.)
130. 449 F.2d at 1113.
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alternatives) seek "to insure that each agency decision-maker has before
him and takes into proper account all possible approaches to a particular project (including total abandonment of the project) which would
alter the environmental impact and the cost-benefit balance."' 131 Several
pages later he expanded this reading to conclude that only the AEC
could undertake the balancing:
Certification by another agency that its own environmental
standards are satisfied involves an entirely different kind of judgment. Such agencies, without overall responsibility for the pardcular federal action in question, attend only to one aspect of the
problem: the magnitude of certain environmental costs. They
simply determine whether those costs exceed an allowable amount.
Their certification does not mean that they found no environmental damage whatever. In fact, there may be significant
environmental damage (e.g., water pollution), but not quite
enough to violate applicable (e.g., water quality) standards. Certifying agencies do not attempt to weigh that damage against the
opposing benefits. Thus the balancing analysis remains to be done.
It may be that the environmental costs, though passing prescribed
standards, are nonetheless great enough to outweigh the particular
economic and technical benefits involved in the planned action.
The only agency in a position to make such a judgment is the
agency with overall responsibility for the proposed federal action132
the agency to which NEPA is specifically directed.
Given this interpretation of NEPA, it was logical to conclude that the
AEG had the power to set standards at variance with those set by the
states. This interpretation, however, is not consistent with the legislative history of section 21(b) of the Federal Water Quality Act.
Section 21(b) was disposed of on the ground that the legislative
history was too meager to support the conclusion that state certification
eliminated further AEC duties under NEPA in light of section 104 of
NEPA which provides:
Nothing in Section 102 and 103 shall in any way affect the
specific statutory obligation of any Federal agency (1) to comply
with criteria or standards of environmental quality, (2) to coordinate or consult with any other Federal or State agency, or (3) to act,
or refrain from acting contingent upon the recommendations or
certification of any other Federal or State agency.
131. Id. at 1114.
132. Id. at 1123.
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Judge Wright construed Section 104 as making 21(b) certification a
minimum condition to granting a license: "It does not preclude the
Commission from demanding water pollution controls which are morc
strict than those demanded by the applicable water quality standards
of the certifying agency."' 33 This construction rests on the distinction
between discharges which violate applicable water quality standards,
and those which do not but still constitute pollution. However, such
a distinction is not supported by the legislative history of 21(b) and
NEPA, and runs counter to Senator Muskie's theory that state environmental agencies ought to have the final say in setting standards.
Further, Judge Wright's distinction is not supported by the commonly accepted definitions of water pollution and water quality standards. 34 Pollution is generally thought of as the specific impairment
of the beneficial use of water. Standards, in theory, function to fix the
desired beneficial uses and the scientific criteria and methods of supporting the uses. 13 5 In the initial stages of a water quality control program,
it is not useful to tie a definition of pollution to administratively imposed standards because the desired level of abatement, and thus, the
level of standards needed, is uncertain. 13 6 It is useful to give a court, as
the federal legislation does, flexibility to find that a discharge constitutes
pollution without reference to water quality standards, or, that it does
not constitute pollution because the standard is unreasonable. It is true
that 21(b) certification "does not mean . . ." that the state agency

"found no environmental damage whatever," but it does imply that
133.

Id. at 1124.

134. The history and theory of the standards approach to water pollution control is
discussed in Hines, Controlling Industrial Water Pollution: Color The Problem Green, 9
B.C. IND. & CoM. L. REv. 553, 584-94 (1968).
135. Pollution control measures may be applied without established standards. The
federal government can bring an abatement action for the discharge of pollutants without
establishing standards for the water. 23 U.S.C. 116-(a) (1970). But, the statute contemplates
that after standards have been established, they will form the basis for enforcement
actions since a discharge which lowers the quality of the water below that required by the
standards is subject to an abatement action. 33 U.S.C. 1160(c)(5) (1970).
If the discharge violates water quality standards, the federal government can bypass
the conference and hearing procedure, see text accompanying notes 111-12 supra, and
proceed to file a court action after giving 180 days notice to alleged violator. However, the
consent of the governor of the state in which the discharge occurs must be obtained
unless the pollution endangers the health and welfare of persons in another state. See
Comment, supra note 112, at 95.
136. See Professor Michaelman's insightful discussion of the analogous question of
whether private nuisance suits ought to be allowed against an activity which conforms to
a comprehensive set of centralized regulations. Michaelman Book Review, Pollution as a
Tort: A Non-Accidental Perspective on Calebresi's Costs, 80

YA

L.J. 647, 675-77 (1971).
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the agency has decided that the discharge will not constitute pollution.
Judge Wright is, therefore, justifiably concerned that current
concepts of pollution do not take into account long run damage, and
that thermal discharges cannot be wholly regulated by reference to preset standards. But, his statement that "[c]ertifying agencies do not
attempt to weigh the damage against opposing benefits" is not reflective
of the regulatory process. That is exactly what they do in setting standards and issuing permits. 137 To require AEC review of the impact of
the proposed discharge adds little except another layer to the process.
Judge Wright defines pollution as significant environmental
damage which is not quite enough to violate applicable water quality
standards. As we have suggested above, pollution should be defined in
terms of a state's water quality standards. The distinction between a
discharge which violates applicable water quality standards, and one
which does not, but nonetheless constitutes pollution, appears to adopt
the common assertion that state water quality standards are set too low
(apparently on a theory of judicial notice).135 This may be a valid
assumption, but there is no occasion for judicial intervention if the
legislature has considered the problem and implemented a solution.
Section 21(b) was enacted after a review of the experience the states
and the AEG had in regulating thermal pollution, and thus the defects
in both approaches have been thoroughly explored. It was decided
that, on balance, it is better to place the certifying authority in the
states rather than in a federal agency which has an inherently conflicting
mission, i.e., that of both promotion and regulation. Judge Wright's
hope that in some cases the AEC would decide that the environmental
benefits of non-development outweighed the benefits of a nuclear power
plant is a modem version of Don Quixote tilting at windmills, 3 9 and
more importantly, it is precisely the decision that the Senate decided
the AEG was highly unlikely to make. There is also less need for an
additional layer of review because, under the Rivers and Harbors Act
137. See, e.g. Nav YoRK PuB. HEALTH LAiW § 1230. New York has adopted regulations
for thermal discharge permits. 10 NYCRR 73. 11-19, reprinted in Z ENVIRON. REP. STATE

WATE LAWs 861:0703-06. The utility is required to prepare and submit a biological inventory of the area to be effected by the proposed discharge.
138. The charge is frequently made that standards are set too low for reasons such
as industry domination of agency "advisory" committees. See Environmental Protection
Act of 1970, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Energy, Natural Resources, and the
Environment of the Comm. on Commerce, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., 39-57 (1970).
139. The opinion vindicates the theory that public intervention should seek all
possible forums, not to win an agency victory, but to mobilize for a legislative victory. See
Like, supra note 94.
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of 1899, the federal government can proceed directly against a utility
if a proposed discharge causes thermal pollution. 140
Calvert Cliffs is the first major judicial acceptance of the argument
that NEPA expands the jurisdiction of federal licensing agencies.
The question was considered during the hearings and in conference,
but the precise relationship between NEPA and existing enabling
legislation was not defined. 141 Section 102 requires that " to the fullest
extent possible" all laws and regulations are to be interpreted in accordance with the policies of NEPA. The Conference Report substituted the above language for a section which provided that nothing
in NEPA shall increase or decrease the responsibility of any agency
created by other provisions of law. Section 103 requires all agencies to
review their legislation to determine if the agency's enabling legislation
permits full compliance. A strict reading of these sections in light of
their legislative history suggests that the NEPA is not jurisdictional, but
that it expresses a policy of statutory construction for agencies and
42
If
courts to follow in resolving cases of doubtful statutory authority.
the First Circuit's legislative history is correct, the Atomic Energy Commission Act is legislation which does preclude full compliance with
NEPA, and Calvert Cliffs is inconsistent with New Hampshire v. AEC.
However, there will be no oppoitunity for the Supreme Court to decide
the issue because the AEC (under new chairmanship) has announced
140. United States v. Florida Power & Light Co., 311 F. Supp. 1391 (S.D. Fla. 1970). The
court held that a discharge could be enjoined under the Rivers and Harbors Act but
refused to do so because there was no showing of irreparable injury. The utility and the

government reached a settlement which banned all direct discharges into Biscayne Bay
after five years (a body of water whose natural temperature in the summer approached
the lethal limit of many species), and required the utility to construct a canal through
which the discharges would be made. CurrentDevelopments, 2 ENVIRON. REP. 521-22 (1971).

Under Exec. Order 11547, all industries proposing to discharge wastes into navigable
waters must obtain an effluent permit from the Corps. The program is poorly integrated
with existing water pollution control programs and questions such as whether the Corps
has the power to modify a 21(b) certificate remain unanswered. See MvYsR & TARLOCK,
ECONOmIc AsPx'Ts OF ENVIRONMENTAL PRoTEcTioN 160-72 (1971), and
Rogers, Industrial Water Pollution and the Refuse Act: A Second Chance for Water
Quality, 119 U. PA. L. Rav. 761, 812-19 (1971).
141. The principal drafter of the original legislation, a professor of political science
SELECTED LEGAL AND

at Indiana University (Bloomington), asserted that "we are talking here in some cases
of modifying or amending existing mandates to agencies." Senator Jackson, a lawyer, saw
problems with this statement but was not in favor of a case by case examination of existing
agency enabling legislation because it would delay passage of the bill. This is the extent
of consideration of the problem. Hearings on S. 1075 before the Senate Comm. on Interior
and Insular Affairs, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 117 (1969).
142. The argument that NEPA is jurisdictional is made in Hanks & Hanks, supra
note 4, at 251-58.
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it will not appeal Calvert Cliffs and has enacted regulations which
require it to perform the balancing of all environmental factors demanded by Judge Wright.14
IV.

LOCAL AND STATE REGULATION OF PLANT SITING AND TRANSMISSION LINE LOCATION

A.

LOCAL ZONING AND PUBLIC UTILITY COMMISSION PREEMPTION

Units of local government generally have the power to regulate utility
site selection through zoning. They are often denied the power, however, to decide the location of the transmission line corridors because
that is a matter of state-wide concern over which the utilities commission should have exclusive jurisdiction. The reason for this fragmented
authority may be that site zoning is relatively easy to obtain, but transmission line corridors have often been opposed by municipalities and
landowners. Because of AEC regulations, 14 large plants, especially
nuclear ones, are located in small communities which are generally
anxious to broaden their tax base. 4 5 This can encourage overly hasty
approval and hence an inadequate review of the impact of the site on
the community's land use pattern. For this reason the Supreme Court of
at least one state, Washington, has imposed a higher standard on local
planning commissions and legislative bodies for the conduct of rezoning
hearings for large-scale industrial activities than has been required
under traditional concepts of procedural due process. In Chrobuck v.
143. 36 Fed. Reg. 18071 (1971). The extent to which the AEC will make an independent review of all environmental considerations is not clear. The applicant is required
to prepare an Environmental Report which is submitted at the time of application for a

construction permit and then circulated to other federal agencies for comment. After
comments have been received the Director of Regulation will prepare a "final detailed
statement of the environmental considerations ...." The detailed statement will contain
a final cost-benefit analysis which considers and balances the environmental effects of the
facility and the alternatives available for reducing adverse environmental effects, as well
as the environmental, economic and technical, and other benefits of the facility." A license
will not, of course, be issued without a 21(b) certificate but such certification is only
entitled to "due consideration." Id. at 18073. However, the project can still go forward
even if serious environmental risks are disclosed by either the applicant or the Commission.
In making this decision the Commission can consider "The effect of delay in the conduct
of the activity upon the public interest." Id. at 18074. In the first major test of these regulations the AEC has allowed the Trogan nuclear plant in Oregon to go forward while the
final environmental impact report is prepared, giving as its reason the high cost of delay
and the power shortage in the Pacific Northwest. Wall Street J., Nov. 15, 1971, at 8, col. 2.
144. ELEcRic PowER AND THE ENVIRONM ENT, supra note 27, at 9.
145. New England River Basins Commission, ENVIRONMENTAL EVALUATION OF
SEA3Roo,

Nzw HAArPsHnm NucLER POWE

No. 2, IV-A-I-3 (January, 1971).

PLANT, POWER AND THE ENViRONmENT, REPORT

540

SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45:502

Snohomish County,14 an oil company secured an amendment to the
county's comprehensive plan over the opposition of the local planning
commission staff, and won a subsequent map amendment to locate a
refinery in a 635 acre rural area previously designated for residential
and recreational use. During the amendment hearing, the county planning commission refused to allow cross examination of the chairman of
the board who had been sent on an "educational" trip to Los Angeles
by the oil company. The court found no "dishonest, dishonorable or
self-serving motives of conduct"'147 by the members of the planning
commission, but voided approval by the two bodies. It was "driven to
the conclusion that the unfortunate combination of circumstances...
and the cumulative impact thereof inescapably cast an aura of improper
influence, partiality and prejudgment over the hearings thereby creating and erecting the appearance of unfairness." The court's justification
merits careful consideration:
In so doing, we start with the premise that comprehensive planning and zoning proposes and imposes limitations upon the free
and unhampered use of private as well as public property, and
when such regulations are once enacted, the indiscriminate amendment, modification or alteration thereof tends to disturb that
degree of stability and continuity in the usage of land to which
affected landowners are entitled to look in the orderly occupation,
enjoyment, and development of their properties. Perforce, by the
very nature of our society, the initial imposition of zoning restrictions or the subsequent modification of adopted regulations compels the highest public confidence in the governmental processes
bringing about such action. Circumstances or occurrences arising
in the course of such processes which, by their appearance, tend to
undermine and dissipate confidence in the exercise of the zoning
power, however innocent they might otherwise be, must be scrutinized with care and with the view that the evil sought to be remedied lies not only in the elimination of actual bias, prejudice,
improper influence or favoritism, but also in the curbing of conditions which, by their very existence, tend to create suspicion,
generate misinterpretation, and cast a pall of partiality, impropriety, conflict of interest or prejudgment over the proceedings to
48
which they relate.'
The opinion is a significant attempt to improve the zoning process
by striking at one of its fundamental defects-the conflict between the
146. 78 Wash. 2d 884, 480 P.2d 489 (1971).
147. Id. at 496.
148. Id. at 495.
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promotional and regulatory roles of the planning commission (and local
legislative body). In theory the planning commission is to represent
the community-wide interest in specific zoning decisions. Far too often
in practice it consists of real estate developers or their proxies. However,
unlike an agency like the AEC this conflict does not appear in the formal structure of the local procedure. Courts have thus tended to ignore
the problem by classifying the decisions as legislative and retreating
behind the fiction that they are presumed to be made on the basis of
community-wide considerations. Accordingly, the presence of conflicts
of interest has generally been ignored except in flagrant cases. Chrobuck
is a step toward the more effective implementation of the fundamental
guarantees of the rule of law: ".... that deciding officers shall be independent in the full sense, free from external direction by political and
administrative superiors . ..and inwardly free from the influence of
personal gain and partisan or popular bias ....149
In some states the public utility commission has the power to grant
utilities immunity from local zoning ordinances which attempt to regulate transmission corridor routes.0 0 In others, courts have reached the
149. Jones, The Rule of Law and the Welfare State, 58 CoLuM. L. REv. 143, 145
(1958).
150. See, e.g., N.J.SA. 40:55-50 (1967). See also notes 151 and 162 infra. The Massachusetts Department of Public Utilities can exempt utilities from local zoning ordinances
and can issue an order setting aside the zoning ordinance and permitting construction upon
a finding that the utility's proposal is necessary for the convenience or welfare of the
public. MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 40A, § 10. But local authorities have considerably more
power to force modification of transmission line routes.
Two separate orders are issued by the Department: one is a finding of necessity and
convenience for a line along a certain location and the second is an authorization for a
utility company to acquire needed lands by eminent domain. MAss. GEN. LAwS ANN. ch.
164, § 72. See Sudbury v. D.P.U., 343 Mass. 428, 179 N.E.2d 263 (1962). The statute provides
for notification to the towns affected by the proposal, plus notice and a hearing in
one or more of the affected towns. Once the eminent domain power is authorized for a
particular project there are two limitations on its use. Land dedicated to another public
use (including land of another public utility), may not be taken without the consent of
the authority or company having jurisdiction over such land. The second is that the
utility must acquire from the local government "all necessary rights in the public ways
or public places . . . through which the line will or does pass." MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch.
164, § 72. There is also a procedure by which "necessary rights" for crossing streets with
lines are to be acquired from municipal authorities. The board of aldermen or selectmen
are directed to hear applications for street crossing permits and to grant permission on
such terms as will not "incommode the public use of public ways or endanger or interrupt
navigation." MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 164, § 72. A refusal to grant the petition of a
utility for a street crossing may, after three months, be appealed to the Department of
Public Utilities. MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 166, §§ 121-22. But this appeal cannot be taken
unless the applicant utility has been granted street crossing permits in either a majority
of the towns through which the line will pass or in two adjoining towns along the
proposed route. Thus, when a solid bloc of towns along a proposed transmission line route
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same result by finding that the state and local regulations are in conflict,
and that the state intended to preempt the field of utility regulation by
creating a public utilities commission.
In public utility cases a conflict between state certification and
local zoning is said to arise from the widely accepted premise that
utilities are best controlled by legislation which is uniform throughout
the state. This is consistent with the general rule of preemption which
favors higher units of government because they have a political jurisdiction and concomitant planning responsibility which is statewide in
scope.' 51 Thus, in a leading New York case the court held that a local

zoning ordinance which excluded a transmission line conflicted with
the state public utility commission's authority because "[t]here is an
absolute mandate by the State that petitioner [the utility] shall furnish

and provide such service... and no local government shall nullify or
interfere with that right and duty... without unequivocal and express
statutory grant of authority .... ", 52 The court flatly refused to find this
authority in the zoning enabling legislation.
If the environmental standards are imposed by a state-wide agency,
there is no reason for a court to hold that the public utility commission
are opposed to overhead construction of the line, and no two adjoining towns can be
persuaded to permit the overhead line, the Department of Public Utilities is unable to
hear an appeal and overrule the towns. While appeal may be taken to the courts, the
Supreme Judicial Court has ruled that a town may refuse to permit overhead street
crossings on esthetic grounds. "The presence of power lines across a public way can, in
our view, disturb natural beauty sufficiently to create real annoyance to the public users
of the way, particularly in a day when such beauty seems to be a rapidly diminishing
asset." Boston Edison Co. v. Selectmen of Concord, 555 Mass. 79, 242 N.E.2d 868 (1968).
151. See Note, Governmental Immunity From Local Zoning Ordinances, 84 HARv. L.
REv. 869, 878 (1970); Aviation Services Inc. v. Bd. of Adjustment, 20 N.J. 275, 282, 119
A.2d 761, 765 (1956).
152. Consolidated Edison Co. v. Briar Cliff Manor, 208 Misc. 295, 144 N.Y.S.2d 379,
384 (Sup. Ct. 1955). A New Jersey court had no trouble deciding the intent of the
legislature vis-A-vis public utility zoning conflicts: "The lawmakers knew that if the
zoning power of a municipality were paramount, it would probably be exercised with an
eye toward the local situation and without consideration of the best interests of consumers at large in other communities whose convenience and necessity require service....
[I]f the local authorities were supreme the Board of Public Utility Commissioners could
not compel a utility to provide adequate service if the zoning ordinance conflicted with
the need for expansion or extension of its services within the municipality." In re
Monmouth Consolidated Water Co., 47 N.J. 251, 258, 220 A.2d 189, 192 (1966). Accord,
Duquesne Light Co. v. Upper Saint Clair, 377 Pa. 323, 105 A.2d 287 (1954) and Graham
Farms, Inc. v. Indianapolis Power & Light Co. 249 Ind. 498, 233 N.E.2d 656 (1968). For a
discussion of subsequent Pennsylvania cases, see Lansdale & Buchmann, Regulation of
Land Use Affecting Utilities, 1967 ABA SECTMON REP oRT, PUB. Unmnrr LAW 68, 70. See
Note, Zoning, State Utilities and Licensees, 1965 WMH. U.L.Q. 209-11.
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has paramount jurisdiction absent express statutory authority. The
most useful role that a court can play in this type of conflict is to hold
that the commission and the environmental agency have concurrent
jurisdiction so that the legislature will be forced to devise a method of
accommodating power and environmental interests. This solution was
recently adopted by the California Supreme Court in Orange County
58 The pubPollution Control District v. Public Utilities Commission.1
lic utilities commission authorized the construction of a fossil fuel
plant along the Southern California coast after the county air pollution
control district had refused to issue a permit on the ground that there
was insufficient evidence that the utility could meet a recently enacted
regulation which limited the discharge of SO 2 to 200 pounds per hour.
The court unanimously held that the commission had paramount
jurisdiction only over local agencies which imposed regulations on
public utilities,154 and that there was no evidence of legislative intent
to exempt power plants from compliance with air pollution district
standards. 155 The commission's major argument was that the district
was a local agency and would fail to protect statewide interests. However, the court noted that while California has a statewide air resources
board, the major task of implementing state policy falls on county
or regional boards approved by the county board of supervisors.' 58
Thus, the court correctly reasoned that the interests of these districts were not purely local because they were legally separate entities, and more importantly, because their function was to implement
state air quality standards pursuant to authority delegated by the state
legislature.' 57 The court concluded "that the Legislature has established
one statutory scheme for the general regulation of public utilities,
another for the general regulation of air pollution."'5 8
153. 4 Cal. 3d 945, 484 P.2d 1361, 95 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1971).
154. Cf., Los Angeles Ry. Corp. v. Los Angeles, 16 Cal. 2d 779, 108 P.2d 430 (1940)
holding the PUC's jurisdiction is paramount if the matter is of state-wide concern.
155. An alternative ground for decision would have been that the utility failed to
exhaust its administrative remedies by failing to appeal from the denial of the permit
by the air pollution control district. The court's decision to go to heart of the merits may
be punishment for the utility's decision to attempt to hide behind the public utility commission's power when blocked by the district.
156. CAL. HEALTH & SArry CODE §§ 24198 and 24224(a) (West Supp. 1971).
157. It is significant that the regulation was subsequently adopted by all districts in
the South Coast basin, as this shows the court to be correct in its theory that the regulation
was in part, as well as the theory, comprehensive and covered the entire region affected
by the problem.
158. 4 Cal. 3d at 953, 484 P.2d at 1367, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 23.
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This same result can be reached when a city or county which has
not been expressly preempted by the state attempts to regulate the

route chosen by the utility, or the design of its transmission towers. The
fact that a public utilities commission occupies a position superior to the
local agency in the political hierarchy does not imply that it has special
competence to protect environmental values. And, the requirement
that the utility perform specific services does not imply a legislative
decision to grant it immunity from local land use regulation. The
broad rationale of Orange County Pollution Control District is that

state environmental and energy policies are entitled to equal weight
unless the legislature has indicated a clear preference or created a forum
with a mandate to resolve the conflict.
Further, the regulation of land use patterns for esthetic reasons
(which is increasingly recognized as a valid zoning purpose) serves both
local and statewide interests. Few states have effective statewide planning and control, and as a consequence, state land use policy must be
administered by units of local government which are technically agents

of the state.15 9 Judicial fears that these local agencies will hamper the
development of power plants can be relieved by the creation of judicial
standards which distinguish on the one hand between the power of a
city to restrict the choice of routes considered environmentally detrimental or to condition approval of routes on design and other modifications, and, on the other attempts to exclude the utility completely or to
require conditions that impose on it unreasonably prohibitive costs. 160
159. See State v. Jersey Central Power & Light Co., 55 NJ. 362, 262 A.2d 385 (1970).
The Supreme Court held that a utility which did not apply for state exemption under
N.J.S.A. 40:55-50 (1967) remained subject to local regulation and that it was not the
function of a court to consider the reasonableness of a zoning ordinance because "some
local power through zoning exists as to any utility installation, but with the final 'say-so'
resting in the state agency, subject to judicial review." 262 A.2d at 388.
Cf. Note, supra note 151, at 878, and In re Presnell v. Leslie, 3 N.Y.2d 584, 165
N.Y.S.2d 488, 144 N.E.2d 381 (1957) (no federal preemption of local regulation of radio
towers by FCC licensing of amateur radio operators) and Thompson Industries v. Port
Washington North, 55 Misc. 625, 286 N.Y.S.2d 187 (1967) (FAA promulgation of Helliport
Design Guide was not evidence of intent to preempt local regulation of helliport locations).
160. Detroit Edison Co. v. Wixom, 382 Mich. 673, 172 N.W.2d 382 (1969) is a good
illustration of the possible use of this standard. The utility had purchased a four mile
right of way through a city for the construction of a 40 mile transmission line. Ten
years after the route was chosen and one year after commission approval, the Wixom
city council passed an ordinance prohibiting overhead towers in excess of 100 feet and
required city approval for all overhead lines intended primarily for service areas outside
the city. The utility, in compliance with a public service commission requirement, planned
to construct 130 foot towers. The Michigan Supreme Court held that the ordinance was a
taking of vested property because the "... acquisition is an integral part of a contiguous
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In most states, the legislature has indicated that both the regulation of land use and the supply of electricity are important state interests, but has not indicated the relative weights to be given when the two
policies conflict. Courts could set standards to accommodate these two
legislative policies along the lines of a recent Michigan court of appeals
opinion which held that a utility was not immune from local zoning:
The limits of this local power are coincidental with the reasonableness of the ordinance under all the circumstances. Supply and
transmission of electricity are essential to the development of this
State and the well-being of its citizens. The limits of local regulation must be construed in the light of this public purpose and
their reasonableness of course must weigh their relation to local
conditions with their effect on the broad purpose.161
However, such a standard may unreasonably expose the utilities to the
danger that one community, or a small group of communities, acting
under a higher preference for esthetics than those of surrounding communities,'1 2 could either prevent the development of the utility or
cause serious problems "by the fact that the regulating political entity
contains few, if any, of the customers who will have to pay the increased
land use (here a right-of-way) and substantial investment, (here over 6 million dollars), in
total, unitary usage has been made in good faith.. ." Id. at 386. The court's decision to
rest their result on constitutional grounds is unfortunate for it does not provide standards
for future location conflicts. It would have been preferable had the supreme court expanded
the reasoning of the intermediate appellate court by formulating a standard which
distinguished between regulations invalid because they expose the utility to costs not
imposed by other towns along the route, and those which are valid because they reflect
the town's legitimate interest in protecting its amenity levels as a part of a uniform
pattern of regulation.
161. 10 Mich. App. 218, 159 N.V.2d 230, 232-33 (1968), rev'd on other grounds, 382
Mich. 673, 172 N.W.2d 382 (1969).
162. The problem is illustrated by the history of transmission line regulation in
Ohio. State ex rel. Cleveland Illuminating Co. v. Euclid, 169 Ohio St. 476, 159 N.E.2d 756,
aff'd on reconsideration, 170 Ohio St. 45, 162 N.E.2d 125 (1959) held that OHIO REV. CODE
4933.13 (1954) expressly permitted municipalities to regulate the construction of plants
and transmission lines. Specifically, they held that a city could require a 33 kilovolt (KV)
transmission line, which would pass through an industrial district, to be placed underground to eliminate safety hazards, even though a master had found that the line would
be safe above ground. The decision was reversed by the legislature. OHIo REv. CODE 4905.65
(Supp. 1970). A municipality cannot exclude or require the undergrounding of lines in
excess of 22 KV if the service is necessary for political subdivisions other than the one
imposing the regulation and the line would not affect the city's general welfare to a
greater extent than those other areas affected by the overhead lines. The statute was
upheld against a challenge that it violated the home rule rights of Ohio cities. Cleveland
Illuminating Co. v. Painesville, 10 Ohio App.2d 85, 226 N.E.2d 145, af'd 15 Ohio St.2d
125, 239 N.E2.d 75 (1965).

546

SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45:502

rates that may be required by onerous regulations.

168

But this is an

overly constricted view of the problem. The benefits derived from high
quality open spaces and other esthetic requirements are not limited to
the local community imposing the stricter standards; they are a matter
of statewide concern and inure to the benefit of all. Thus, it is proper
for people outside the immediately benefiting community to bear part
of the cost. However, when the stricter local regulations are not the
result of pure esthetic improvements, but are, for example, the result
of more rigorous procedural requirements (such as multi-layered
administrative hearings), then the cost should not be borne by the community actually using the utility but should be borne by the community
imposing the requirement. Obviously, the better solution is to have a
state-wide agency decide the environmental questions involved in
corridor and design decisions. But, in the interim this judicial approach
might have the beneficial impact of encouraging community cooperation in planning for utility expansion.
B.

ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION BY PUBLIC UTILrrY COMMISSIONS

This discussion of local zoning as a means of utility site selection control
suggests the need for a state-wide forum to resolve these conflicts. Many
states have achieved this result by establishing a public utilities commission. It is a logical institution to undertake the difficult task of accommodating both power and environmental interests not because commissions have special competence in environmental regulation nor
because they are prepared to give power and environmental interests
equal weight in decisions, but rather because they have the authority
to finance decisions recognizing environmental values. The commission
can include the cost of pollution abatement facilities or design modifications in the utility's rate base.16 4 Moreover, commissions have some
163. Lansdale & Buchmann, supra note 152, at 75.
164. Re Commonwealth Edison Co., No. 55149 85 P.U.R.3d 199 (Ill. Comm. Comm'n
1970). Commonwealth Edison, a Chicago utility, was granted a 7% rate increase for urban
and industrial service but the increase was conditioned on the utility's applying 50%
of the increase to take "all steps technologically and economically feasable to reduce and
abate pollution of the environment by its operations .

.

.

."

85 P.U.R.3d at 229. A

recent Michigan Public Service Commission opinion indicates that utility management
may have wide discretion to err on the side of environmental protection in deciding how
much pollution control equipment to install. In the Midwest utilities, the states and the
federal government have long been at odds over the establishment of a thermal policy
for Lake Michigan. In an effort to avoid expensive and time consuming litigation with
conservation organizations, a Michigan utility agreed to construct cooling towers for a
plant on Lake Michigan. Utility management contended that the towers were not
presently necessary to protect the ecology of the lake but sought commission approval to
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authority to influence the amount of power consumed by users. They
can discourage the use of electricity by modifying rate structures like
block rate pricing (lower rates for increased consumption of electricity)
for uses which might properly be classified as marginal. 65 It is unrealistic, however, to expect commissions to decide how much electricity
and energy our society should use. If the question of how much industrial growth we "need" is to be resolved as a conscious public policy
choice, it can only be done through the political process.166
From an environmental standpoint, one of the most serious defects
in modem public utility commission regulation is the widespread
practice of allowing a utility to choose a site, undergo extensive planning and design, and in some cases to commence actual construction,
167
before a certificate of public convenience and necessity is required.
The result is, of course, that the commission finds it extremely difficult
to deny the permit at such a late and costly stage. At best, the commission generally approves the permit request with some conditions attached. Thus, in most states it will be necessary to expand the powers
of the public commissions beyond their traditional role of general
consumer protection-which made rates, under-financed utilities, and
the public-private power balance their prime concerns. In 1968, for
example, Maryland, by statutory provision, 68 required its public utilinclude them in its rate base. The Commission neither approved nor disapproved the
agreement on the grounds that at the present time the extent of the costs were "conjectural" and thus inclusion in the rate base should be deferred. The Commission stated
that it would not interfere in management action unless there was an abuse of discretion,
or the decision was substantially detrimental to the interests of the public, and found
neither present. The utility was authorized to include the towers in the commission's
uniform system of accounts but was told that a decision as to whether the expense would
be included in the rate base would be deferred until an application for a rate increase
was made. In re Consumers Power Co., 3 ERG 1001 (Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm. 1971).
165. Hearings on Intergovernmental, supra note 14, at 230 (statement of Charles E.
Olson and John Cumerland, University of Maryland). See Note, Power and the Environment: A Statutory Approach to Electric Facility Siting, 47 WAsH. L. REv. 35, 50-51 (1971).

Another area of utility practice that has come under scrutiny is the active promotion of
the use of electricity. State commissions have begun to regulate these activities more
strictly. See ABA, 1971 ANNUAL REPORT, SECTION OF PURLIC UTILrTY LAW 100-01. There
is no easy answer to formulating regulatory policy for the utility can support block rate
pricing-on the theory that it provides built-in protection against a recession because
revenues can fall less rapidly under such a structure-to counter environmentalist objec.
tions that the rate structure is perverse because it stimulates demand. See id. at 235.
166. See d'Ange & Hunt, supra note 3 (a plea for a national economic policy to
decrease resource-use level).
167. In 1969 only 26 states required a certificate of public convenience and necessity prior to construction. _Ecrlsc POWER AND THE ENVIRONNENT, supra note 27, at 56.
168. MD. ANN. CODE art. 78, div. 54(A) (1968). The statute only applies to plants
or overhead transmission lines designed to carry an excess of 69,000 volts.
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ities commission to hold pre-construction hearings on plant location
before the certificate of public convenience and necessity could be
granted. This barred the utility from commencing construction or using the power of eminent domain until it obtained the certificate.
In addition to the traditional criteria of reliability and capacity to
serve the market, the Maryland statute also requires the commission
to give "due consideration" to the impact of the project on "aesthetics,
historic sites, and, when applicable . . . air and water pollution." A

similar but stronger statute was passed by Vermont in 1969.100 The
Vermont commission must find that the project "will not have an undue
adverse effect on aesthetics, historic sites, air and water purity, the
natural environment and the public health and safety" before a certificate can be issued. Thus, in Maryland the commission can trade off the
need for power against substantial environmental degradation after a
full hearing while the Vermont commission appears more constrained
from making this choice.
Another major defect in the existing decision-making processes is
the insufficient weight attached to environmental questions. Methods
like those discussed above help solve the timing problem by bringing
the commission's regulating function into the process at an earlier
stage, but they do not insure that the commission will attach sufficient
weight to the environmental considerations involved. If the range of
possible alternatives is to be fully considered, the commission must
formulate its own environmental criteria against which each application can be judged. The courts, close to the limits of their capacity to
deal with these substantive questions of environmental quality, 170
increasingly defer to commission decisions unless they are clearly unreasonable or unlawful.' 7' However, the commissions are themselves
deferring to the decisions of the utilities, who base their decisions on
169. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 30, sec. 248(4) (1969).
in
170. See Professor Louis Jaffe's review of J. SAx, DEmFENDNG THE ENVIRONMr,"
84 HARv. L. REv. 1562, 1566-68 (1971). The basic problem is that natural resources decisions are better dispensed in terms of a variety of goals rather than a single goal such as
the defendant's right to a fair trial. Such decisions are inherently political and are better
dealt with through political institutions. As Professor Jaffe reminds us:
Where the legislature has faced up to the contemporary problems and has
made its policy clear, there is simply no basis for a court's disallowance of an
administrative determination which satisfies the rules of law and has fairly and
substantially met the burdens imposed by the rules for the protection of the
environment.
Id. at 1568.
171. See Bowers v. Pennsylvania Public Utility Comm'n, 204 Pa. Super. 82, 208 A.2d
324 (1964).
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cost, safety and maintenance factors and not upon environmental concerns. Further, while many states have expanded the jurisdiction of
the commissions to include consideration of environmental effects,
they have failed to establish standards that insure that environmental
considerations will be entitled to equal weight with traditional efficiency considerations. Thus, in New Jersey the commission must find
that the route is "reasonably necessary" to enable the utility to perform
its service and that the community zoning plan was considered. 7 2 However, the cases indicate that this requirement places only a minor burden on the utilities whose site and route choices will be approved by
both the commission and the courts if the interests of the local community and any available alternatives are considered to be "outweighted" by cost considerations. 7 3 An almost impossible burden is
placed on those challenging a corridor or site selection, which provides
little incentive for the commission to question the utility's judgment
except in extreme cases.' 7 4
These problems cannot be solved merely by enacting legislation
which requires the commission to consider environmental impacts in
its licensing procedures. In 1963 the California Public Utility Commission held that its broadly worded enabling legislation gave it the
authority (and even the duty) to consider environmental impact in the
172.
(1961).

In re Public Service Electric Gas Co., 35 N.J. 358, 376-77, 173 A.2d 233, 243

173. In re Public Service Electric & Gas Co., 100 N.J. 1, 241 A.2d 15 (1968) held that
consideration of six alternative routes discharges the utility's duty to consider the
proposed project's impact on the community. See also White Mountain Power Co. v.
Whitaker, 106 N.H. 436, 213 A.2d 800 (1965). Public utility commissions have been worried
about the equity of requiring all of the utility's customers to pay for undergrounding
that directly benefits a small group, apparently on the theory that it should be financed
as a special benefit. In New Hampshire Elec. Co-op., 71 P.U.R. 3d 414 (N.H. P.U.C.
1967) the Commission refused to require the undergrounding of a 310 foot transmission
line across from the mainland to a lake over the esthetic objections of lake front owners,
but gave the property owners a chance to negotiate with the utility over the payment of
the cost of undergrounding. In most transmission line cases (although perhaps not in
this one) it would seem proper to spread the cost of the undergrounding through the
rate base because otherwise those paying for the undergrounding would be producing a
public good-an amenity level-but would be unable to recover the cost by charging
all those who benefit from it.
174. Under the present system the issue of alternative routes is often raised for the
first time by intervenors before the commission. Utilities have effectively countered
demands for route re-consideration at this late date by arguing that the cost of delaying
construction to consider alternatives would be large; the commission has used this as
major reason for rejecting the proposed alternatives and granting the certificate of public
convenience and necessity. See Kouba, Regulating Transmission Lines in CaliforniaInsulation from Aesthetic Shock, 22 HAsT. L.J. 587, 604-06 (1971).
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location of facilities. The result has been that corridor route challengers
face one of the heaviest burdens of proof in the country and the traditional imbalance between power and the environment remains unaltered. The standard was defined as follows:
The Commission should only interpose its jurisdiction in adjudging public convenience and necessity in matters relating solely
to aesthetics where the proposed action of a utility is of the type
which shocks the conscience of the community. 7 5
In a subsequent decision the commission spelled out the implications of the standard-it will consider esthetics but only "in association
with its primary duty to assure that adequate and reliable service is
provided to the public at rates which are just and reasonable."' 176 The
complainants have the burden of proving an adverse environmental
impact and of establishing a more desirable and feasible alternative
route; this includes questions of technical feasibility, cost and right
of way acquisition.
This seems to be an inappropriate standard for a public utility
commission to adopt. In constitutional law the permissible limits of
governmental action are stringently defined by the courts because of
the preferred status of individual rights. However, there is no analogous
justification for raising low-cost electric power to a similar position
vis-h-vis esthetic and environmental values. One could assume, we
believe erroneously, that state power facility location policy is contained
solely in the commission's enabling legislation and requires deference
to the utility's efficiency decisions so that consumers can enjoy low
power rates. This assumption ignores other statutes which express a
concern for environmental values and the protection of the visual
landscape. Such statutes suggest that the commission's public interest
mandate is broader than the mere promotion of efficiency, and may
indeed compel the commission to conclude that countervailing esthetic
benefits dictate the selection of a more costly route or underground
transmission lines.
If environmental concerns are to receive equal weight in commission proceedings two reforms are necessary. First, if the complaint
makes out a prima facie case that utility action will have an adverse
environmental impact and that feasible alternatives exist, the burden
175. Ligda v. P.U.C., 61 Cal. P.U.C. 1, 5 (1963). Accord, In re Commonwealth Edison, 85 P.U.R.3d 199 (I1. Comm. Conm'n 1970).
176. Angell v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., Cal. P.U.C. Case No. 8929, Dec. No. 77003
(1970) discussed in Kouba, supra note 174, at 595-99.
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of proving the necessity of the plan should shift to the utility.177
This responsibility should improve the utility's decision-making procedures and spur them to give greater consideration to decisions which
will maximize environmental protection. All information is costly and
the technical information necessary to evaluate the reasonableness and
feasibility of alternative designs and routes is especially costly. Moreover, information is to a large extent a public good so it is unlikely that
enough will be produced by voluntary organizations.178 Thus, the
information will have to be developed by either the utilities or regulatory agencies. Eventually the general public will pay either as taxpayers
or consumers, but the case seems stronger for imposing the burden on
the utilities because research and development "funding by the electric
utilities represents an investment by consumers to assure future price
7 9
and availability of electricity."' Second, the commission should assume the responsibilities mandated by Scenic Hudson, a0 and undertake studies in each case to deter177. The leading case establishing this principle is Texas Eastern Trans. Corp. v.
Wildlife Preserves, Inc., 48 N.J. 261, 225 A.2d 130 (1966). The court held that a private
wildlife refuge could challenge a utility pipeline condemnation and if both a prima fade
case of adverse environmental impact and the existence of a feasable route were shown,
the burden of proof shifted to the condemnor: "[T]he quantum of proof required of this
defendant to show arbitrariness against it should not be as substantial as that to be
assumed by the ordinary property owner who devotes his land to conventional uses."
The utility ultimately won after a full trial on the merits. 49 N.J. 403, 230 A.2d 505
(1967). See Tarlock, Recent Natural Resources Case, 8 NAT. Rm. J. 1 (1968).
178. See Calabresi & Bass, Right Approach, Wrong Implications: A Critique of
McKean on Products Liability, 38 U. Cm. L. REV. 74, 98 (1970).
Discussing the problems of consumer products information, Davis and Kamien
argue: "The point is that knowledge of the characteristics of a product is very analagous
to a public good.. .. Although there are obvious costs associated with the production
of knowledge of a product's characteristics, the producer of that knowledge cannot help
to recoup anything even approximating its value to the consumer. . . . This situation
means.., that the producer of this knowledge cannot afford to produce as much informa." Davis & Kamien, Externalities, Information as would be socially optimal ....
tion and Alternative Collective Action, The Analysis and Evaluation Of Public
Expenditures: The PPB System, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 67, 72 (1969). The general theoretical framework for this argument is developed in M. OLSON, THE Locic oF CoLLEacvE
AcnoN 33-43 (1968). Applied to environmental action interest groups such as the Sierra
Club, it suggests that the organization might provide some information about power
plant problems but prior to the provision of what society would consider an optimal
amount they would shift their resources to purchase of other goods-say wilderness
areas-that yield higher returns to larger numbers of the organization. See Krier, Environmental Watchdogs: Some Lessons From a "Study" Council, 23 STAN. L. REv. 623, 644-65
(1971).
179. EL Ct C PowER AND THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 27, at 42. The major role of
regulatory agencies should be to remove the present uncertainty over whether utilities can
recover research expenditures; this uncertainty is alleged to be a major factor in keeping
research "far below an appropriate level for an industry of this size." Id.
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mine if the route chosen by the utility will minimize environmental
damage. Although information at the engineering level can best come
from the utility itself, improved environmental-impact data can best
come from organizations, whether public or private, that are primarily
engaged in such work, e.g., universities and government agencies, and
that are free from the pressure to advance their client's interests, Cost
considerations may dictate that few transmission lines be placed underground but commissions have more flexibility in deciding which route
will produce the least amount of landscape blight.
New York moved in this direction by its transmission line siting
bill passed in 1970181 but deferred consideration of power plant siting
legislation by creating a special committee to report to the 1971 session
of the New York State legislature. The intent of the transmission siting
structure is to consolidate "all matters of state and local law, in a single
proceeding to which access will be open to citizens, groups, municipalities and other public agencies ....,8 2 A utility desiring to construct a
transmission line with a capacity greater than 125 KV must obtain a
certificate of environmental compatability and need from the public
service commission.183 To improve the quality of information available
to the understaffed commission the utility must furnish "a summary of
any studies which have been made of the environmental impact of the
project.. ." and a description of "any reasonable alternative locations
for the proposed facility."'-8 4 The statute does not, however, require
environmental impact studies to be made by the utility. The commission cannot issue a certificate until it finds that "[t]he facility represents
the minimum adverse environmental impact, considering the available
technology and the nature and economics of various alternatives, and
other pertinent considerations."'81 5 Although the traditional defenses to
environmental modification-cost and the unavailability of technology
180. See Section III(A) supra.
181. N.Y. PUB. SERv. LAW § 120-30 (McKinney Supp. 1971). For a discussion of the
regulation of power plant siting in New York, see Note, The Legal Setting of Nuclear
Powerplant Siting Decisions: A New York Controversy, 57 CORNELL L. REV. 80 (1971).
182. Chapter 272, 1970 New York Legislation, sec. 1. The utility is required to give
notice both to officials of towns through which the transmission line will pass and to
certain state departments. In addition the utility is required to give notice to the town
residents by publication. Any resident may become a party to the proceedings by filing
a notice of intent with the commission. N.Y. Pun. SEmy. LAws §§ 122(2)(a)(v)(b) and 124(h)
(McKinney Supp. 1971). The same procedure is specially available to "any domestic

non-profit corporation" concerned with environmental protection. Id. § 124(1)(i).
183. Id. § 120-21.
184. Id. § 122(1).
185. Id. §-126.
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-are preserved, this law should be a model for other states because it
represents the highest affirmative duty yet imposed on a public utility
commission to examine the environmental impacts of a proposed transmission line route.
V.

INSTITUTIONAL REFORMS

Open dissatisfaction with site selection procedures began in late 1968,
when the White House Energy Policy Staff published their study
entitled Considerations Affecting Steam Power Plant Site Selection.
Although the study scrupulously avoided recommendations, the facts
suggested several major problems with selection procedures. These
included the secrecy of utility planning for new construction (as exemplified by Vermont Yankee), the delay caused by the proliferation of
license and permit requirements, the oblique nature and increasing
incidence of judicial review of siting decisions, and the wide differences
in standards applied by the several states.
In 1969 the Energy Policy Staff formulated recommendations for
the federal government, while several state legislatures enacted new
statutes. The EPS' second volume, Electric Power and the Environment, was transformed into proposed legislation early in 1971. This
second report generally ignored choice-of-fuel questions and concentrated on the institutional aspects of choosing site and design. The EPS
proposals adopt the strategy of federal air and water pollution legislation. They encourage the states to adopt standard procedures for
licensing new thermal generating plants and EHV construction under
the penalty of federal agency licensing in states which fail to adopt
proper procedures. The principal procedures are:
(a) The licensing of new facility construction by special multiagency and multi-interest site certifying councils;
(b) The pre-emption, by such a proceeding, of all other state
and local permit and license requirements;
(c) The retention of all applicable requirements of federal law
governing new facility construction except for section 102 of
the NEPA;
(d) The public disclosure, several years ahead of time, of new
construction plans and intentions of private and public electric power entities;
(e) Notice, public hearings and limited judicial review of the
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decisions of site selection councils in their exercise of the
foregoing powers.

The first three procedures are generally the components of "one-stop
licensing." The last two are the principal components of "open planning."
A.

ONE-STOP LICENSING

The government's increased reliance upon permit-granting regulatory
mechanisms has raised the number of permits and licenses required to.
construct and operate thermal generating stations and EHV lines. 80
To alleviate the inefficiency of this multi-licensing trend, Electric Power
and the Environment recommended the adoption of "one-stop licensing" which would require each concerned state agency to send a
representative to a site-certifying committee.
The first use of this procedure began in Washington in 1970.187
The Washington statute creates an evaluation council, composed of (1)
the directors, administrators, or the designees of every conceivably concerned resources or planning agency, (2) the department of commerce
and economic development, (3) the utilities and transportation commission, and (4) a representative of any county affected by an application.188
This statute was the result of a compromise between the utilities
and the sponsors of a much stronger environmental bill. The original
bill required both a site location and a. design license, and public membership on the commission. It further specified 26 criteria for consideration. 89 The original proposal did not specify the relationship between
between the commission's licensing powers and those of existing state
and local agencies although the intent of the principal drafter was that
it "should function as an inter-agency coordinating mechanism, with
each authority retaining and exercising its existing statutory powers to
prescribe conditions for-and perhaps to veto-design features of a
particular facility or perhaps the location itself."' 19 0 The utilities insisted
186. A case study of the construction history of a nuclear plant in Waterford,
Connecticut indicated that between 1965 and 1970 the utility had to obtain nine major
permits, licenses, and approvals from six federal, state and municipal agencies. See
generally EG-aric POWER AND THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 27, at 7-14.
187. Wash. ch. 45, § 3, 41st Legis. 2d ex. sess. (1970).
188. Id. § 4(c).
189. H.B. 194 (1969).
190. Rogers, Siting Power Plants in Washington State, 47 WAs. L. REy. 9, 23 (1971).
Professor Rogers drafted the initial legislation.
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that any legislation must guarantee them "one-stop" licensing. They
were successful because the act provides that "the state preempts the
regulation and certification of thermal power sites and thermal power
plants,"1 91 and that a certification "shall bind the state or any of the
departments."' 192 But these sections do not clearly answer the crucial
question: Can the council supersede the authority existing agencies
possess under their enabling legislation? The council first proposed
that the utilities present "evidence of satisfying existing statutory
criteria,' ' 1 93 but the utilities argued that this was inconsistent with a
"one-stop" agency. The utilities' proposed guideline required them to:
[s]ubmit information as to the extent of compliance with existing
statutory criteria, requirements, standards and regulations of those
state agencies which, prior to certification, have any legal authority
over conditions or activities related to the site.194
The guideline adopted by the council rejected the utilities' position
that they need not comply with existing state agency standards, but
not as clearly as the initial proposal. It provides that the utilities must:
•. .
*submit plans relating to satisfaction of existing statutory
criteria, requirements, standards and regulations of those state
agencies which, prior to certification, have any legal authority over
conditions or activities related to the site.' 95
The guidelines on individual environmental matters are more stringent. For water quality, the utility is required to:
(a) provide plans for the compliance with regulations relating to
waters of the State of Washington; (b) provide plans for waste heat
dissipation at all proposed sites including plans for off-stream
cooling facilities for power sites located adjacent to fresh water
bodies and estuarine locations. 196
The Washington experience indicates that one-stop licensing can
be either a means of preventing delays in plant construction, or a means
of shielding utilities from regulation by agencies that have a statutory
mandate to improve environmental quality. The purpose of creating
a regulatory body to issue a single license should be to eliminate the
191. Wash. ch. 45 § 11(2), 41st Legis. 2d ex. sess. (1970).
192. Id. § 12(1).
193. Memo to Thermal Plant Siting Council, Proposed Guidelines For Thermal
Power Plant Site Certification, William Rogers (University of Washington, April 20, 1970).
194. Id.
195. WAsH. ADMIT. CODE 463-12-010(5).
196. WAsH. ADurN. CODE 463-12-025(2)(a).
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utility's high costs resulting from construction delays necessitated by
requiring as many as 20 to 25 permits for a single project. The utility
needs to be protected from state agencies imposing inconsistent require-

ments after construction has begun, 19 7 but there is less need to extend
this protection before the license is issued. The agency's primary func-

tion should be to coordinate the activities of the agencies with statutory
jurisdiction over the plant. 98 If it is functioning properly, it will pro-

duce simultaneous, efficient consideration of the utility's plans by all
interested agencies and thus eliminate the existing gantlet. Many con-

flicting policies and regulations could probably be harmonized by the
licensing agency without resort to the power to preempt. But, if the
agency can displace the statutory powers of specialized agencies there
is a danger of shielding the utility from stringent regulation. This
conception of one-stop licensing threatens to rob it of any value in
accommodating environmental interests and energy demands. Further,
it is conceivable that a court could find the latter alternative a violation
of the equal protection clause. 09
The bill which the administration has sent to Congress would
encourage the other states to emulate Washington, except for the
governor's veto power; it threatens to assume control of site certification
as a federal function in any state which fails to adopt procedures for
2°0
one-stop licensing within two years of the passage of the federal act.
197. See Rogers, supra note 190, at 14-16.

198. This seems consistent with the intent of the federal legislation which "is one
of factoring into the certification process the data, information, recommendations, findings
or conclusions of those charged with the administration of environmental requirements
and thereby to facilitate the intergrated decision of the certifying agency." Nassikas
(Chairman of the FPC), Coordination of Electric Power and Environmental Policy, 4
NAT. REs. LAw. 268, 273 (1971).
199. Those still affected by the general regulatory program might complain that
they were denied equal protection as the objects of an unreasonable classification, since
pollution was now to be controlled by licensing all discharges except those in the electric
power business. This has been described as an under-inclusive classification--"[a]ll who
are included in the class are tainted with the mischief, but there are others also tainted
whom the classification does not include." Tussman & ten Brock, The Equal Protection
of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REv. 341, 348 (1949). Such classification systems have generally
received judicial tolerance, providing they avoided such forbidden bases as race, religion,
or ethnic origin. It would still be necessary for the state to establish, in constitutional
litigation, that the reasons for singling out the electric power industry for different treatment were based on facts and were not arbitrary. Boortz Coal Co. v. Air Pollution
Comm'n, 2 ERC 1744, 1749 (Comm. Ct. of Penn. 1971). But see Sigety v. State Bd. of
Health, 2 ERC 1415, 1 ELR 20258 (Mont. Sup. Ct. 1971), holding an exemption from
surface mining regulations for the sand and gravel industry a denial of equal protection
to the industries being regulated.
200. H.R. 5277, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
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The states are to base their legislation on presidential guidelines covering site selection criteria, procedures for public participation and
interstate cooperation, and assurances of adequate staffing for site
certification councils.2 0 After the state site certifying authority has been
established and the federal guidelines have been issued, the consistency
between the two must be determined. The determination is made by
what the bill calls the "Federal certifying agency." 202 No specific agency
is named; that choice is left to the President's discretion.20 3 (The President's stated intention is to name the proposed Department of Natural
Resources as the federal certifying agency, 204 but that option depends
on congressional approval of the proposed reorganization of the cabinet.) The federal certifying agency will approve or disapprove the
structure of each state site certifying authority. The federal agency must
specify to the state affected its grounds for any disapproval and give
the state a reasonable period to respond and make appropriate
changes. 205 If this fails to bring about agreement, the state may appeal
to a United States Court of Appeals and ultimately to the Supreme
20 6

Court.

201. Id. § 9. The section spells out the guidelines as follows:

(a) criteria for evaluating effects of proposed sites and facilities on environmental values;

(b) criteria for use in evaluating the relative environmental impacts of alternative sites;
(c) criteria for evaluating the projected needs for electric power;
(d) procedures to ensure full public participation in the certification procedures
through public notice and opportunity for public hearings, consultation
with appropriate citizens' groups, rights of intervention and appeal from
decisions of the certifying body and other safeguards;
(e) procedures with respect to the formation of regional certifying bodies;
(f) procedures to assure proper consideration of multi-State impacts in certification proceedings;
(g) requirements with respect to staffing and technical and professional competence of State and regional certifying bodies.
Many of these criteria and procedures are spelled out or hinted at in ELELcrmc Powan
AND THE ENVIRONMFrNT, supra note 27. The Administration presented "draft proposed
federal guidelines" when committee hearings began in the House in May 1971. Hearings
on Powerplant Siting and EnvironmentalProtection before the Subcomm. on Communications and Power, Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 92d Cong., 1st Sess.,
240-46 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Powerplant Siting Hearings].
202. H.R. 5277 § 5(b), 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
203. Id. § 5(d).
204. Letter from Edward E. David, Jr. transmitting proposed legislation to Congress,
reprinted in CEQ, The President's 1971 Environmental Program, at 242. In the interim,
or in the event a Department of Natural Resources is not established, the Department of
the Interior would be designated as the federal certifying agency. Powerplant Siting
Hearings, supra note 201, at 240 (testimony of Hon. Rogers C.B. Morton, Secretary of
the Interior).
205. H.R. 5277 § 5(d), 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
206. Id. § 5(e).
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When the federal agency approves the state's approach it issues a
"certificate of qualification of procedure" 20 7 (hereafter, a CQP). The
bill makes the CQP "conclusive evidence" of the state agency's legal
authority over the construction of electrical energy facilities. 20° By giving the CQP conclusive evidentiary value at least the procedural legiti20
macy of the state agency will not be in issue.
The bill raises some problems in proposed relationships with other
statutes. H.R. 5277 would require the decision of a site certifying
authority to be "conclusive on all quesions of siting, land use, state
air and water quality standards, public convenience and necessity,
aesthetics, and any other State or local requirements ... 210 Further,
it expressly preserves-with one exception-all applicable requirements under federal law for permits and licenses. 211 This major exception states that no environmental impact statement under § 102(2)(c)
of the NEPA need be filed if the site certifying agency follows procedures "substantially comparable" to the review procedures of the
Council on Environmental Quality.212 These sections appear to diminish the weight given to environmental considerations in siting decisions
because they undermine the existing authority of state environmental
agencies. The other pertinent federal requirements, however, would
provide for independent environmental review and in some instances
restore the authority of state agencies and commissions. State water pollution control agencies, for example, have the power to certify a proposed project's compliance with its water quality standards on any federal permit application. 213 Under § 111 of the Clean Air Act, EPA is
required to establish federal standards of performance for new stationary sources of air pollution; states which establish satisfactory enforcement programs may become the recipients of EPA's delegated authority
to control new stationary sources.214 Thus, if H.R. 5277 abolishes the
requirement that a permit for a power plant be obtained from a state
air quality agency, it either amends the Clean Air Act, which intention
207. Id. § 5(b).
208. Id.
209. See Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947), which held that the federal government
can force state courts to enforce federal penal statutes. The courts have held that the

federal government can delegate the power of federal eminent domain to private parties
such as Federal Power Commission licensees. Chapman v. Public Utility District No. 1,
367 F.2d 163, 167 (9th Cir. 1966).
210. H.R. 5277 § 7(a), 92d Cong., Ist Sess. (1971).
211. Id.

212. Id. § 16(a).
213. FWQA § 21(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1171(b) (1970).
214. 42 U.S.C. 4321 (Supp. 1971).
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the bill disavows,215 or disqualifies the states from acting as primary enforcers and pushes EPA into the direct enforcement role, which contravenes the policy of the Clean Air Act.210 It would seem that the Congress
will rewrite this aspect of the bill to at least leave air and water quality
programs unaltered, or to define carefully the relationship between
power plant siting and pollution control programs. Unfortunately, the
latter option is unlikely because of the untidy structure of congressional
committee jurisdiction. 217 Thus, H.R. 5277, for all its mighty labors,
fails to accomplish true one-stop licensing. To accomplish this goal, Congress would have to divest all federal agencies of their licensing and permit granting authorities over emissions from electric power facilities
and offer these responsibilities to the states. Given the political costs of
such a move, and the danger that the new institution would offer little
assurance that currently under-represented environmental interests
would be given increased weight, alternatives to one-stop licensing must
be explored.
One alternative is an "omnibus license." A central state licensing
agency could be authorized to coordinate and schedule all permit and
license applications and proceedings to be conducted by the several
agencies and commissions according to their regular rules and procedures. 218 The coordinating authority would pass on the residual issues.
If construction of the project seemed warranted, the coordinating authority would issue an omnibus license. This would be a single document incorporating the terms of the individual agencies and commissions with the terms set by the coordinating authority in its review of
the residual issues.
Connecticut's 1971 siting legislation

19

establishes something anal-

LR. 5277 § 7(a), 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971). Spokesmen for federal environment
215.
agencies reiterated their views to this effect before Congress. Powerplant Siting Hearings,

supra note 201, at 311 (statement of Dr. Gordon J.F. MacDonald, member, Council on
Environmental Quality); id. at 625 (statement of John Quarles, General Counsel, Environmental Protection Agency: "If the State air pollution control agency were to determine
that a power plant would, at a given site, violate applicable ambient air quality standards, or the requirements of an approved implementation plan, then a certificate could
not be issued.').
216. 42 U.S.C. § 1857(a)(3) (1967).
217. Power plant siting legislation has generally been referred to the Senate's Committee on Commerce and the House's Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.
Neither of these committees has jurisdiction over water pollution legislation and only

the House committee has jurisdiction over air pollution.
218. This proposal is similar to recommendations made in the report by the
New England River Basins Commission, LAws AND PROCEDURES OF POWER PLANT SrnmN IN
NEW ENGLAND, POWER AND THE ENVIRONmENT, REPORT No. 2, at 73-75 (1970).
219.

1971 Conn. Gen. Assembly, Pub. Act No. 575.
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ogous to an omnibus license. The proceedings of the Connecticut Power
Facility Evaluation Council preempt local government land use regulation,220 but a power facility must otherwise conform to "applicable state
and local laws and regulations issued thereunder, all of which shall be
binding upon the applicant.... ."21 The statute also requires the council
to consult with the principal resource agencies and to obtain their written comments on a proposed facility before issuing a license.2 22 Thus,
the resource agencies retain their permit-granting jurisdiction in Connecticut and have the opportunity to register their more general opinions in other forums. The composition of the Connecticut council differs significantly from that in other states, in that the resource agencies
are not members. Their interests are represented by the Commissioner
of Environmental Protection, who is the head of the department which
houses most of the resource agencies. This relationship between the
agencies and the Commissioner, plus the requirement that the agencies
comment in writing on a proposal, would appear to satisfy the proposed
federal standards for broad-based participation in decision-making.
Another partial approach to an omnibus license scheme is the nonstatutory review procedure devised by California in 1966. The umbrella
Resources Agency formed a thermal power plant siting committee consisting of representatives from seven environmental agencies. Under the
procedure the utilities voluntarily agreed to submit their site and design proposals for committee review prior to applying for federal and
state licenses.
If the utility's plans are approved, it enters into a preconstruction
agreement with the Resources Agency. In return for the applicant's concessions on design and construction, the seven separate agencies agree
not to contest the utility's certificate applications before the Atomic
Energy Commission and the state Public Utilities Commission. In the
first use of this procedure a Pacific Gas and Electric Company plant near
San Luis Obispo was approved after the utility made certain design
modifications, undertook a monitoring effort in cooperation with the
state and promised that if damage to the aquatic life occurred, it would
provide "reasonable mitigation ... provided such mitigation will not
interfere with the construction of the plant unless otherwise agreed."228
This form of agreement seems to represent the limit of the agency's
220. Id. § 12.
221. Id. § 10(a)(6).
222. Id. § 4(0.
223.

1968 Thermal Pollution Hearings, supra note 18, Part IV at 1091-93.
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effectiveness because as originally conceived the California procedure
has several significant shortcomings. 224 It affects only the third level of
decision-making, leaving the first two-choice of energy form and of
site-to the initiative of an applicant. It makes no provision for involvement of the non-governmental sector of the environmental community.
There is no provision for scientific studies of the natural resources involved by the state agencies entrusted with their care. The siting committee basically reacts to utility decisions which are difficult to reverse.
Many of these shortcomings, however, may be relieved by the Power
Plant Siting Coordination Act enacted in 1970225
B.

OPEN PLANNING AND JUDICIAL REVIEW

Insufficient time to evaluate the impact of proposed power plant construction has been a complaint of environmental groups and state and
local agencies. Electric Power and the Environment flatly stated that
"[t]he public is not assured of advance notice of new construction nor
of any opportunity to express its views on particular projects before a
public body with authority to act in response to it."'228 The electric utilities are compelled to plan future expansion to meet projected demands, but such plans are generally kept secret as long as possible because the utilities fear both excessive land acquisition costs and public
227
controversy if they give early disclosure of potential sites.
The administration's bill would have the utilities bear these burdens by requiring them to file annual statements of their plans for
future construction. These would be in two parts: a general description
of generating station sites and transmission line routes under consideration for 10 to 15 years ahead, 228 and relatively specific plans for sites and
routes contemplated within the ensuing five years.2 29 Most utilities cur224. A Stanford Law School student interviewed the committee chairman and the
Public Utility Commissioners. The chairman thought the agreements had "acquired

legitimacy before the state and federal agencies," but the PUC labeled them "superfluous
and irrelevant" on the grounds that they have exclusive jurisdiction over powerplants.
Bores, Power Plant Siting in California, Part I, at 9 (unpublished paper, written for a
Water Law Course, January 4, 1970, copy on file with S. CAL. L. REv.) The California
Supreme Court has held that the Commission's jurisdiction is only concurrent with state

environmental agencies.
225. CAL. PUB. UnTL. CODE § 2852 (West Supp. 1971). See text accompanying
notes 240-42 infra for a discussion of the legislation.
226. EL.cruc POWER AND THm ENVMONMENT, supra note 27, at 15.
227. Considerations Affecting Steam Plant Site Selection, supra note 11, at 6. See

text, Part IV supra.
228. H.R. 5277, § 4(a)(1).
229. Id. § 4(a)(2).
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rently operate somewhat along these lines in cooperation with the FPG.
The six Regional Advisory Committees appointed by the FP0 in
1965230 to up-date the National Power Survey are producing 10- and
20-year planning reports. 281 These reports and the National Power Survey are not, however, intended as blueprints or to compel the construction of particular facilities. 28 2 They represent only such information as
the regional power pools, reliability councils, and individual utilities
contribute.
The pending legislation would require a utility to go beyond these
efforts by (1) filing a current plan annually,28 3 (2) distributing the plan
to public agencies and environmental groups, 234 and (3) conforming its
applications for new facility construction permits to sites identified in
the plan, except for good cause.2 3 Furthermore, the site certifying
agency would review each planning document 288 and would hold a public hearing 2 7 concerning each site or route identified in the fairly specific five-year plan. After the hearing, a site may be ordered deleted
from the utility's five-year inventory if its development would "unduly
impair important environmental values." 2 8 This standard could be
interpreted either as a sop to soothe the more troglodytic utility
executives or as a means of shifting the burden of proof to opponents of
the plant. In our opinion it will accomplish the latter.
There is no reference to a site's relationship to power needs. The
bill's initial description of the five-year plan refers to an "inventory of
sites for all plants on which construction is to be commenced in the
succeeding five years... ,"239 But the omission of any convenience-andnecessity test in the standards for approving the five-year inventory implies that the inventory may exceed actual needs. As such, it might seem
proper to have the environmental agencies conduct the review. But the
administration's bill calls for review by the multi-interest siting council,
which theoretically will have a balance of environmental and energy
production interests. For a public utilities commissioner to vote on what
230. FPC Order No. 383-2, Jan. 10, 1966, 35 FPC 58 (1966).
231. E.g., Northeast Regional Advisory Committee, Electric Power in the Northeast
-1970--1980--1990 (1968).
232. FPC Order No. 383-2.
233. H.R. 5277 § 4(a), 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
234. Id. § 4(b).

235. Id. § 6(b).
236.

Id. § 8(a).

237. Id. § 8(c).
238. Id.
239.

Id. § 4(a)(2) (emphasis added).
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constitutes undue impairment of important environmental values will
undoubtedly trouble some environmentalists.
California's Powerplant Siting Coordination Act of 1970 directs
the Resources Agency to develop a 20-year plan for the "optimum location" of generating sites in the state, 240 which are defined as "locations
deemed suitable from an environmental standpoint." 241 The Resources
Agency must also make choice-of-fuel decisions.
The plan shall contain recommendations of the type of fuel to be
used in the generation of electric power at each generating facility
location identified in the plan so that the least deleterious effect
on the environment is achieved consistent with reasonable
economy and efficiency of operation. 242
To give choice-of-site planning responsibility to a state natural
resources department, as California has done to some extent, may actually lessen the effectiveness of a natural resources department in affecting site selection. The state resource agencies (such as fish and game
and water quality) have responded fairly effectively to power plant
proposals by raising new questions, urging additional environmental
studies, buying time and forcing design concessions. To put these agencies in charge of selecting new sites could deprive the public of the
principal source of critical outside appraisal. The agencies will be
pressured to plan enough sites to avoid blackouts and will then be required to defend their selections. An electric utility could logically conclude that state-run site selection was to its own best advantage.
An optimum middle ground between the positions of the Energy
Policy Staff and the State of California may give the state resources
agencies a planning responsibility, but not for selecting new sites.
Rather, the agencies would prepare and maintain a "relative-impacts"
plan, an inventory of the resource values of feasible sites and the sensitivity of those values to the side-effects of new bulk power supply facilities. Under this procedure much important data would have been as240.
241.

CAL. PuB. UrL. CODE § 2852 (West Supp. 1971).
Id. § 2853. California has begun to designate areas of the state which should not

be the site of public utility plants or transmission lines. The Agriculture Reserve Act
states that a utility facility should not be located in an established reserve "if there is
other land on which it is feasible to locate the public improvement." CAL. Gov'T CoDE
§ 51292 (West Supp. 1971). However, this section is only a policy that the public utilities
commission must consider along with all other relevant criteria in deciding whether to
issue a certificate of public convenience and necessity, and does not apply if the facility
has been approved by the commission. Id. at § 51293(c).
242. CAL. PUB. UTM. CODE § 2854 (West Supp. 1971).
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sembled before the application from the utility. This process would be
somewhat analogous to the planning principles of Ian McHarg, where
development-sensitive areas are progressively blocked out on the map
2 43
until the most developable areas remain.
In its planning provisions, the 1971 Maryland statute combines
elements of the proposed federal policy with a "relative-impacts" approach. 244 The Public Service Commission proposes "possible and proposed" sites on the basis of plans drawn by the utilities in an annual
10-year plan submitted to the Secretary of Natural Resources, 40 who
exercises an environmental review of these sites. 240 The Secretary may
classify a site as unsuitable from an environmental standpoint after a
preliminary investigation 247 if the relevant utility cannot offer substantial evidence to the contrary.248 The effect of an unsuitable rating
is not significant: the site is deleted from the plan for the year in which
it was proposed, but it is not prevented from being included in subsequent 10-year plans. It is unfortunate that the promulgation of the
10-year plans and the licensing process were not more closely related.
For example, if the utilities were required to file applications only for
sites included in the currently approved 10-year plan (except for good
cause shown), or if the plan represented some prima facie evidence of
suitability, the planning provision might represent some substantial
240
contribution to early airing of potential environmental problems.
As it stands, however, the utility has no incentive to divulge its plans
with the specificity which the legislation appears to anticipate, and the
20
Public Service Commission need not suggest specific sites. 1

243.
244.
on April
245.

I. McHliw, supra note 32, at 34.
Maryland Senate Bill No. 540 entitled "Power Plant Siting," signed into law
23, 1971.
MD. ANN. CODE art. 66C, § 768(1) (Supp. 1971).

246. Id. § 768(2).
247. The considerations enumerated in the statute that are to be the basis of the
preliminary environmental statement include: the environmental impact at the proposed
site; any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should the proposed
site be accepted; proposed alternatives to the proposed site; any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources which would be involved at the proposed site should
it be approved; where appropriate, a discussion of the problems and objections that were
raised by other state and federal agencies and local entities; a plan for monitoring
environmental effects of the proposed action and provision for remedial actions should
the monitoring reveal unanticipated environmental effects of significant adverse consequences.
248. MD. ANN. CoDE art. 660, § 768(2) (Supp. 1971).
249. Of course, there are all sorts of problems with whether a site once included
in a plan must continually face review, or whether a site once found suitable can be

dropped.
250. The full provision of § 768(1) reads:
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The Secretary must also acquire and hold at all times between
four and eight sites "reasonably suitable" for power plant development. 251 These sites are to be available, upon request, to an electric
utility252 which may either purchase or lease it on a 99-year basis.
Strangely, the lease is not subject to termination if it ceases to be used
for the purpose of generating electricity. Most reasonably, however, the
Secretary should have the power either to re-convey the property to
another utility for power purposes if the original utility discontinued
its original use of the site, or in the alternative, to designate the leased
lands for other public purposes.
As noted in Section IV, construction of specific generating and
transmission facilities requires a certificate of public convenience and
necessity from the Public Service Commission (PSC).213 The PSC must
hold a hearing and give "due consideration" to the recommendations
of local bodies and other factors including reliability, esthetics, economics, and effects on air and water pollution. 254 After July 1, 1972,
utilities must file applications two years in advance of construction, 255
and notice must be given to all interested persons, including various
state agencies so they may participate at the public hearing held by
the PSC. The agencies may modify, affirm or amend their initial
recommendations after the hearings, but the final decision rests with
the Commission. Once granted, the certificate constitutes compliance
with the state's air emission standards, as well as authority to dredge or
The Public Service Commission shall be responsible for -assembling and evaluating annually the long-range plans of Maryland's public electric companies
regarding generating needs and means for meeting those needs. The Chairman of
the Public Service Commission shall, on an annual basis, forward to the Secretary of Natural Resources a ten-year (10) plan of possible and proposed sites, including associated transmission routes, for the construction of new electric power
plants within the State of Maryland and extensions of existing plants. The first
ten-year (10) plan shall be forwarded on or about January 1, 1972.
251. MD. ANN. CODE art. 66C, § 769(a)(2) (Supp. 1971). The section also provides
that one site is to be acquired by July 1, 1974, for each electric company generating more
than 1000 MW of electric power and that the minimum inventory thereafter shall contain at least one site reasonably suitable for each such electric company.
The section thus clearly puts a burden on the Secretary to meet the siting requirements of the large utilities within the state. It is not clear whether a company must be
generating 1,000 MW within the state to qualify or whether the Secretary and the Fund
must maintain an inventory of sites for a qualifying utility if it chooses to purchase
out-of-state power. It is further questionable whether the tying together of the state's
demand with sites within the state is practical in this day of highly interconnected, regional

systems.
252. Id. § 769(b).
253. MD. ANN. CODE art. 78, § 54A, 54B (Supp. 1971).
254. Id. § 54A.

255. Id. § 54B(a).
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construct bulkheads in the waters or wetlands of the state and to appro-

priate and use such waters. 25 The one-stop aspect of the procedure is
mitigated somewhat by the specific authorization given to the Secretary
of Natural Resources to seek judicial review of the PSC's final decision
relative to the environmental aspects of power plant siting.2 "
C.

JuDICrAL REvIEw

H.R. 5277 would have a state certifying authority or a federal siting
authority make two basic decisions respecting plant sites: to approve or
disapprove the inclusion of a site in the five-year inventory and to issue
a certificate of "site and facility" upon finding that a site "will not unduly impair important environmental values and will be reasonably
necessary to meet electric power needs. . .

."

All orders and decisions

of the federal siting authority are subject to judicial review under the
Administrative Procedure Act, while state decisions are to be "subject
to applicable state law. '258 The proposed Act would impose so many
decision-making criteria on a state, however, that the scope within
which the "applicable state law" might apply seems quite limited.
Some state courts can reject administrative agency findings of
fact which are not supported by substantial evidence, while others
require findings to be supported by some evidence in the record, or
by the weight of the evidence. Although this much latitude may be
permissible, many questions of interpretation are bound to arise, e.g.,
could a state qualify if it proposed that its courts try some issues of
fact de novo? H.R. 5277 does not speak to this issue despite the potential for inconsistent results between the states. Some states still cling
to the pre-Scenic Hudson notion of "agrieved parties" while others
would readily grant standing to conservation organizations and similar
parties to seek review. Established environmental protection organizations are specifically granted standing by the terms of site selection
statutes enacted by New York in 1970 and Connecticut in 1971.259
256. Id.

257. Id. § 90. Probably the most unique aspect of the Maryland statute is its pro.
vision for funding environmental studies, investigations, and site procurement. An
Environmental Trust Fund is established and funded from a tax levied on each unit of

electricity generated in Maryland. Id. art. 66C, § 766. It is expected to yield four to six
million dollars a year and is to be fully passed on to the electric utility customers. See Fiscal
Report Senate Bill 540, attached to Comments of the Department of Natural Resources

on S.B. 540, and

MD. ANN. CODE

art. 660, § 766(a) art. 78, § 54B(c) (Supp. 1971).

258. H.R. 5277, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. (1971).
259. N.Y. PuB. Sasv. LAw § 124 (Supp. 1971); CONN. PuB. Acr 575, § 8(b).
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The states which have already enacted siting laws have no unusual provisions regarding judicial review. Connecticut provides for
appeals to be heard on verbatim records, with the council's findings
of fact held conclusive if supported by substantial evidence "unless
the court in its discertion determines to find some or all facts de
novo."20 0 In Washington, gubernatorial approval or rejection of an
application is subject to judicial review subject to the state's adminis26 1
trative procedure statute.

The federal judiciary would be given review jurisdiction over
thermal power plant siting in four situations carefully specified in
H.R. 5277. First, there is jurisdiction to hear a state's appeal from the
federal government's denial of a CQP application. 26 Second, there is
review of a federal siting agency's decision when that agency has jurisdiction over an application for a CSF. 26 Third, the holder of a CSF
may acquire necessary land through quick-taking eminent domain
proceedings in federal courts.2 " And fourth, the federal courts are
empowered to enforce the Act through civil and criminal penalties. 26 5
As previously noted, the exemption from NEPA's § 102(2)(c) is
conditioned upon the siting council having procedures "substantially
comparable" to those developed for the preparation of environmental
impact statements. Whether the reviewability of NEPA impact statements in federal courts, as established by a number of recent cases,
would carry over to "substantially comparable" impact statements
under the Power Plant Siting Act is a quesion which the bill does not
answer. Two issues could arise and be cognizable in a federal court:
first, whether a state's procedure was in fact substantially comparable
to NEPA review procedures, and second, whether a particular statement was sufficiently detailed to satisfy the substantive requirements
of the NEPA.
CONCLUSION
Although there is a need to evaluate utility pricing policies which
encourage the use of electricity, the construction of a substantial num260.

CONN. Pun. Acr 575, § 11.

261.

WAsH. ch. 45, § 14(l), 41st Legis. 2nd ex. sess. (1970).

262.

H.R. 5277, § 5(e), 92d Cong., Ist Sess. (1971).

263. Id. § 15.

264. Id. § 10.
265. Id. § 17.
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ber of new power plants must be assumed. Because of the demands
for increased energy production we must restructure the existing
regulatory institutions or create new ones to undertake the difficult
task of accommodating national energy and environmental policies.
Some states have moved in this direction either by expanding the jurisdiction of their public utilities commission or creating power plant
siting agencies. However, crucial questions like whether the utility or
objectors bear the burden of proof in actions to halt plant construction, the status of water and air quality standards and the weight
which will be given to all environmental considerations remain unclear at the present time. The proposed federal power plant siting
legislation is a flawed proposal. The provisions on one-stop licensing,
burdens of proof on site approval and exemption from NEPA appear
to tip the scales in favor of construction and raise questions whether
environmental risks of new power plants will be fully evaluated. The
bill should be considered at most a starting point for future legislation.
The regulation of large-scale power plants will be a crucial test
of the capacity of the administrative process to meet wide-scale demands
for giving environmental considerations serious weight in its decisionmaking. It is by no means clear that existing agencies have this capacity.260 If they do not, a more fundamental legislative debate over questions such as the desired level of material satisfaction and national
industrial output will be in order.
It is at this level that the fundamental problem lies:
It is very widely (though, be it noted, not universally) recognized
that science and technology need to be brought under some more
stringent kind of control. But how are they to be controlled, and
by whom? The answers given to these questions are very diverse
and for the most part unconvincing, even in those studies which
under-take a more or less systematic inquiry to the relation
between technology and society, as distinct from the mass of
journalistic and sensational comment in which the whole subject
threatens to become engulfed.
Their unsatisfactory character is due on one side to the
absence, in most cases, of any theory of society that would provide
a frame for considering science and technology as social phenomena, and on the other side to the lack of any clearly conceived
266. For a plea for the use of the adversary process to examine the need for energy
production and a rejection of the expertise of administrative agencies, see Sive, supra
note 4.

1972]

POWER PLANT SITING

569

social end, a desirable form of human society, which science and
technology, if properly controlled, ought to help us achieve. It is
idle to blame urban planners, corporation executives (whether
public or private), bureaucrats, or miscellaneous others for their
misdeeds, when there exists no political consciousness capable of
267
defining a form of social life to which we should be aspiring.
267.

Bottomore, Machines Without Cause, 18 N.Y. REv. oF BooKs 12 (Nov. 4, 1971).

